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27. 426.



THE ✓ *S.H. 1847.*

CATO MAJOR AND LÆLIUS

OF

C I C E R O;

WITH

A DOUBLE TRANSLATION:

FOR

THE USE OF STUDENTS

ON

THE HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM.


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1827.
426.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY RICHARD TAYLOR, SHOE-LANE.



CICERO'S
L Æ L I U S;

WITH

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
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MARCI TULLII CICERONIS LÆLIUS, SIVE
OF MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO LÆLIUS, OR
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO'S LÆLIUS, OR A

DE AMICITIA DIALOGUS, AD TITUM
FROM FRIENDSHIP A DIALOGUE, TO TITUS
DIALOGUE ON FRIENDSHIP, ADDRESSED TO

POMPONIU ATTICUM.

POMPONIU ATTICUS.

TITUS POMPONIU ATTICUS.



1. Quintus Mucius augur multa narrare de
Quintus Mucius the augur many to relate from
Quintus Mucius the augur used to relate from memory,

Caio Lælio, socero suo, memoritèr et jucundè
Caius Lælius, father-in-law his, from memory and pleasantly
and in a very agreeable manner, many things concerning his

solebat: nec dubitare, illum in omni sermone
was accustomed: nor to hesitate, him in every discourse
father-in-law: nor did he hesitate in every discourse to call

appellare sapientem. Ego autem à patre ita eram
to call wise. I but from father so was
him wise. I had been also so introduced by my

deductus ad Scævola, sumta virili togâ, ut quoad
led down to Scævola, taken manly cloak, that as far as
father to Scævola, when I had taken the manly toga, that as far

possem, et liceret, à senis latere
I might be able, and it might be lawful, from of old man side
as I was able and was permitted, I never departed from the old

numquam discederem. Itaque multa ab eo
 never I might depart. Therefore many by him
man's side. Therefore I committed to me-

prudenter disputata, multa etiam breviter et commodè
 prudently disputed, many also shortly and commodiously
many of his interesting discussions, and many of his brief

dicta memoriae mandabam, fierique studebam
 said to memory I was committing, to be made and I was studying
and ingenious sayings, and I endeavoured to become more learned
 ejus prudentiâ doctior. Quo mortuo, me ad
 of him by prudence more learned. Who being dead, me to
by means of his wisdom. When he was dead, I be-

pontificem Scævola contuli, quem unum nostræ
 pontiff Scævola I brought together, whom one our
took myself to the pontiff Scævola, whom I venture to pronounce

civitatis et ingenio, et justitiâ præstantissimum
 of state and in disposition, and in justice most excellent
the most distinguished man of our republic in talent and in in-

audeo dicere. Sed de hoc aliâs; nunc
 I dare to say. But from this otherwise; now
tegrity. But I must speak of him elsewhere; I now

redeo ad augurem. Cùm sæpè multa, tum memini,
 I return to the augur. When often many, then I remembered,
return to the augur. Among many other subjects I remember

domi in hemicyclo sedentem, ut solebat, cùm
 at home in a half circle sitting, as he was accustomed, when
that when he was sitting in his semicircular room, as he was ac-

et ego essem unâ, et pauci admodum
 also I might be together, and few very
customed, and when I was with him and a few intimate friends

familiares, in eum sermonem illum incidere, qui
 familiar, in that discourse him to fall upon, which
were present, the conversation turned upon that subject which was

tum ferè omnibus erat in ore: meministi
 then almost to all was in mouth: thou rememberedst
at that time in every one's mouth: you well remem-

etiam profectò, Attice, et eò magis, quòd Publio
 also indeed, O Atticus, and thus more, that Publius
ber, Atticus, and so much the more as you were intimate with

Sulpicio utebare multum (cùm is tribunus
Sulpicius thou wast using much (when he tribune
Publius Sulpicius, (when he was tribune of the people, a most im-

plebis capitali odio à Quinto Pompeio, qui
of the people capital by hatred from Quintus Pompeius, who
placable hatred broke out between him and Quintus Pompeius, who

tum erat consul, dissideret, quôcum conjunctissimè
then was consul, might disagree, whom with most conjointly
was then consul, with whom he had formerly lived in the greatest

et amantissimè vixerat,) quanta hominum esset vel
and most lovingly he had lived,) how great of men might be or
intimacy and friendship,) how great was the astonishment and

admiration, vel querela. Itaque tum Scævola, cùm
admiration, or complaint. Therefore then Scævola, when
concern of all men. Therefore at that time Scævola,

in eam ipsam mentionem incidisset, exposuit
in that self mention might have fallen upon, put out
when he happened to mention that matter, took occasion to relate

nobis sermonem Lælii de Amicitîâ, habitum ab
to us a discourse of Lælius from Friendship, had by
to us a conversation of Lælius on Friendship, which Scævola had

illo secum, et cum altero genere Caio Fannio,
him himself with, and with another son-in-law Caius Fannius,
had with him and with another son-in-law Caius Fannius, the son

Marci filio, paucis diebus post mortem Africani.
of Marcus son, few days after death of Africanus.
of Marcus, a few days after the death of Africanus.

Ejus disputationis sententias memoriæ mandavi,
Of that discussion sentences to memory I committed,
The subject of that discourse I have committed to memory, and have

quas hoc libro exposui meo arbitratu :
which this in book I put out my by judgment :
written it down in this book, according to the best of my judgment :

quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne 'Inquam'
as if for selves I led in speaking, not 'I say'
for I have introduced them, as it were, speaking, that I might not

et 'Inquit,' sæpiùs interponeretur : atque
and 'He says,' more often might be interposed : and
be continually repeating the words 'I said,' and 'He said : ' so that

ut tamquam à præsentibus coràm haberi sermo
 that as if by present before to be had discourse
 the conversation appears to be held in the reader's pre-
 videretur. Cùm enim sæpè mecum ageres,
 might be seen. When for often me with you might do,
 sence. For as you have often urged me to write some-

ut de Amicitia scriberem aliquid, digna mihi
 that from Friendship I might write something, worthy to me
 thing concerning Friendship, this conversation appeared to me
 res cùm omnium cognitione, tum nostrâ familiaritate
 thing when of all of knowledge, then our of friendship
 worthy to be known, as well for its own value as for our friend-
 visa est. Itaque feci non invitatus, ut prodessem
 seen is. Therefore I made not unwilling, that I might profit
 ship. Therefore I have willingly complied, that I might

multis tuo rogatu. Sed, ut in *Catone Majore*,
 many thy by request. But, as in *Cato Elder*,
 profit many by your request. But, as in *Cato Major*, which was

quî est scriptus ad te de Senectute, Catonem
 which is written to thee from Old Age, Cato
 written to you on Old Age, I have introduced Cato, an old man,

induxi senem disputantem, quia nulla videbatur
 I led in old man discoursing, because no was seen
 as speaking on that subject, because no person seemed better calcu-

aptior persona, quæ de illâ ætate loqueretur, quàm
 fitter person, which from that age might speak, than
 lated to speak on the subject of old age, than he who had been

ejus, qui et diutissimè senex fuisset, et
 of him, who and a very long while old might have been, and
 for a very long while advanced in years, and who had been in his

in ipsâ senectute præ ceteris flourisset; sic,
 in self old age before others might have flourished; so,
 old age so much distinguished above others; so,

cùm accepissemus à patribus maximè
 when we might have received from fathers very greatly
 since we have heard from our fathers that the friendship between

memorabilem Caii Lælii et Publii Scipionis
 memorable of Caius Lælius and of Publius Scipio
 Caius Lælius and Publius Scipio was very remarkable, Lælius

familiaritatem fuisse, idonea mihi Lælii persona
 familiarity to have been, fit to me Lælius person
appeared to me a proper person to speak on the subject of
 visa est, quæ de Amicitia ea ipsa dissereret, quæ
 seen is, which from Friendship that self might discourse, which
Friendship, which discourse Scævola remembered to have heard
 disputata ab eo meminisset Scævola. Genus
 discoursed by him might have remembered Scævola. Kind
from him. Now

autem hoc sermonum, positum in hominum veterum
 but this of discourses, placed in of men ancient
this kind of discourse, supported by the authority of old and cele-
 auctoritate, et eorum illustrium, plus, nescio quo
 authority, and of those illustrious, more, I know not what
brated men, appears to me, I know not upon what principle, to

pacto, videtur habere gravitatis. Itaque ipse
 by condition, is seen to have of weight. Therefore self
have a peculiar kind of weight and influence. Therefore when

mea legens sic afficior interdum, ut Catonem,
 mine reading so I am affected sometimes, that Cato,
I am reading my own writings, I sometimes imagine that it is not

non me, loqui existimem. Sed ut tum ad senem
 not me, to speak I may think. But as then to an old man
myself, but Cato that speaks. But as in that treatise I

senex de Senectute, sic hoc libro ad amicum
 an old man from Old Age, so this in book to a friend
have written as an old man to an old man concerning Old Age, so

amicissimus de Amicitia scripsi. Tum est
 most friendly from Friendship I wrote. Then is
in this as a friend to a friend concerning Friendship. In that book

Cato locutus, quo erat nemo ferè senior
 Cato having spoken, whom was no one almost older
the speaker is Cato, who was the oldest man in his days, and the

temporibus illis, nemo prudentior: nunc Lælius, et
 in times those, no one more prudent: now Lælius, and
most prudent: in this book Lælius,

sapiens, (sic enim est habitus) et amicitiae gloria
 wise, (so for is held) and of friendship in glory
a wise man also, (for so he was esteemed,) and distinguished by

excellens, de Amicitia loquitur. Tu
 excelling, from Friendship speaks. Thou
the glory of friendship, speaks on the subject of Friendship. I

velim animum à me parumper avertas, Laelium
 I may wish mind from me a little mayst turn from, Laelius
would wish you to remove your thoughts from me, and imagine

loqui ipsum putes. Caius Fannius et Quintus
 to speak self mayst think. Caius Fannius and Quintus
Laelius to be speaking. Caius Fannius and Quintus Mu-

Mucius ad socerum veniunt post mortem Africani.
 Mucius to father-in-law come after death of Africanus.
cus come to their father-in-law after the death of Africanus.

Ab his sermo oritur. Respondet Laelius :
 From to these discourse arises. Answers Laelius :
And with them the conversation arises. Laelius answers :

cujus tota disputatio est de Amicitia, quam
 of whom the whole discourse is from Friendship, which
whose is the entire discourse concerning Friendship, and in reading

legens tu te ipse cognosces.
 reading thou thee self wilt know.
this you will recognize yourself.

2. Fannius. Sunt ista, Laeli : nec enim melior
 Are those, O Laelius : nor for better
Very true, Laelius : for there never was a

vir fuit Africano quisquam, nec clarior ; sed
 man has been Africanus any one, nor more clear ; but
more excellent or more distinguished man than Africanus : but

existimare debes omnium oculos in te esse
 to think thou owest of all eyes in thee to be
you ought to consider that the eyes of all are directed to

conjectos : unum te sapientem et appellant,
 thrown together : one thee wise and they call,
you : you alone they call and consider

et existimant : tribuebatur hoc modo Marco
 and they think : was bestowed this in manner to Marcus
wise : this epithet was also given to Marcus

Catoni : scimus Lucium Atilium apud patres
 Cato : we know Lucius Atilius among fathers
Cato : we know also that Lucius Atilius was called wise by

nostros appellatum esse sapientem: sed uterque
 our called to be wise: but each
 our ancestors: but each of them

alio quodam modo: Atilius, quia prudens
 another certain in manner: Atilius, because prudent
 for another reason: Atilius, because he was con-

esse in jure civili utebatur; Cato, quia multarum
 to be in law civil was thought; Cato, because many
 sidered as being well skilled in civil law; Cato, because he was prac-

rerum usum habebat: multa ejus et in senatu,
 of things use he was having: many of him and in the senate,
 tised in many kinds of knowledge: many instances in the senate and

et in foro, vel provisâ prudentè, vel acta
 and in the forum, or foreseen prudently, or done
 in the forum, either of wise deliberation, or steady performance,

constantè, vel responsa acutè, ferebantur: propterea
 constantly, or answered acutely, were brought: therefore
 or ingenious reply, are related of him: therefore in

quasi cognomen jam habebat in senectute sapientis:
 as if surname now he was having in old age of wise:
 his old age he acquired the surname of wise:

te autem alio quodam modo, non solum
 thee but another certain in manner, not only
 but you are pronounced wise on another account; not only for

naturâ et moribus, verum etiam studio et
 by nature and by manners, but also by study and
 your natural talents and manners, but also for your diligence and

doctrinâ, esse sapientem: nec sicut vulgus,
 by learning, to be wise: nor as the common people,
 learning: nor do the common people only,

sed ut eruditi, solent appellare sapientem,
 but as instructed, are accustomed to call wise,
 but the learned also, call you wise, and in such sense as not one

qualem in totâ Græciâ neminem. Nam qui septem
 as in all Greece no one. For who seven
 is so called in all Greece. For those who are

appellantur, eos, qui ista subtiliùs quærant,
 are called, these, who those more nicely seek,
 called the seven wise men, are not to be considered as really wise

in numero sapientium non habent.
 in the number of wise men not have.
men, inasmuch as they are chiefly distinguished by subtilty of research.

Athenis unum accepimus, et eum quidem etiam
 At Athens one we received, and him indeed also
We hear indeed of one wise man at Athens, and he was pronounced

Apollinis oraculo sapientissimum judicatum: hanc
 of Apollo by oracle most wise judged: this
by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men: this

esse in te sapientiam existimant, ut omnia tua
 to be in thee wisdom they think, as all thine
kind of wisdom is considered as belonging to you,—that you derive

in te posita ducas, humanosque casus virtute
 in thee placed you may lead, human and falls virtue
your happiness from your own mind, and that you consider all

inferiores putes: itaque
 inferior you may think: therefore
the various accidents of life inferior to the power of virtue: therefore

ex me quærunt, credo item ex te, Scævola,
 from me they seek, I believe also from thee, O Scævola,
it has been inquired of me, and I believe of you also, Scævola,

Quonam pacto mortem Africani feras?
 What by condition the death of Africanus you may bring?
In what manner you support yourself under the loss of Africanus?

eoque magis, quòd his proximis nonis, cùm in
 thither and more, that these nearest nones, when in
and so much the more, as in the last month when we met together

hortos Decii Bruti auguris, commentandi
 the gardens of Decius Brutus the augur, of discoursing
in the gardens of Decius Brutus, for the purpose of conversing

causâ, ut assolet, venissemus, tu non
 for the sake, as is accustomed, we might have come, thou not
on various topics, as is our custom, you were not

affuisti; qui diligentissimè semper illum diem,
 wast at; who most diligently always that day,
present; for you were always in the habit of punctually

et illud munus solitus esses obire.
 and that gift accustomed mightst be to go to.
attending on that day, and engaging in those discussions.

Scævola. Quærunt quidem, Cai Læli, multi, ut
 Ask indeed, O Caius Lælius, many, as
 Many persons indeed, Caius Lælius, make that inquiry
 est à Fannio dictum: sed ego id respondeo, quod
 is by Fannius said: but I that answer, which
 of me as Fannius says: but I answer according to what I have
 animadverti, te dolorem, quem acceperis cùm
 I perceived, thee grief, which thou mightest take when
 observed, that you bore with moderation the sorrow which you felt
 summi viri, tum amicissimi morte, ferre
 the chief of man, then the most friendly by death, to bear
 for the loss of that most excellent man and most beloved
 moderatè; nec potuisse non commoveri,
 moderately; nor to have been able not to be moved together,
 friend; that it was not possible that, with your sensibility,
 nec fuisse id humanitatis tuæ: quòd autem
 nor to have been that of humanity thy: that but
 you should not feel the loss: but that your
 his nonis in nostro collegio non affuisses,
 these in nones in our company not mightest have been present,
 absence from our meeting last month was occasioned by your ill
 valitudinem causam, non mœstitiam fuisse.
 health cause, not sorrow to have been.
 health, and not by your sorrow.

Lælius. Rectè tu quidem, Scævola, et verè; nec
 Rightly thou indeed, O Scævola, and truly; nor
 You answered very properly and truly, Scævola; for
 enim ab isto officio, quod semper usurpavi, cùm
 for from that office, which always I used, when
 I ought not to neglect, on account of any private griefs, those
 valerem, abduci incommodo meo debui:
 I might be well, to be led away by inconvenience my I owed:
 duties to which I have been accustomed to attend when in health:
 nec ullo casu arbitror hoc constanti homini
 nor any by fall I think this constant to man
 nor do I think that by any accident it could happen, that a man
 posse contingere, ut ulla intermissio fiat
 to be able to happen, that any intermission may be made
 of any steadiness of mind should neglect his ordinary and accustomed

officii. Tu autem, Fanni, qui mihi tantum
of office. Thou but, O Fannius, who to me so much
duties. But you, Fannius, who say that so high a character

tribui dicis, quantum ego nec agnosco, nec
to be given sayest, how great I nor acknowledge, nor
is given to me, such as I neither acknowledge nor ask, are speaking

postulo, facis amicè: sed, ut mihi videris, non
I ask, thou makest amicably: but, as to me thou art seen, not
from motives of friendship: but you do not appear to me to

rectè judicas de Catone: aut enim nemo, quod
rightly thou judgest from Cato: or for no one, which
judge rightly concerning Cato: for either no one ever was

quidem magis credo, aut si quisquam, ille sapiens
indeed more I believe, or if any one, he wise
wise, which I rather believe, or if any one ever was, he certainly

fuit. Quomodò enim (ut alia omittam)
has been. In what manner for (that other I may omit)
was wise. For in what manner (to pass by other matters) did

mortem filii tulit? Memineram Paullum,
death of son he brought? I had remembered Paullus,
he bear the death of his son? I remember Paullus, I have

videram Gallum: sed hi in pueris; Cato in
I had seen Gallus: but these in boys; Cato in
seen Gallus; but they lamented the loss of sons; Cato

perfecto et spectato viro.
perfect and regarded man.
grieved for his son, who was in the prime of manhood and reputation.

Quamobrem cave Catoni anteponas ne istum
Wherefore beware to Cato thou mayest prefer not that
Wherefore beware how you prefer before Cato, even him whom

quidem ipsum, quem Apollo, ut ais sapientissimum
indeed self, whom Apollo, as thou sayest most wise
the oracle of Apollo pronounced to be the wisest of men as you

judicavit. Hujus enim facta, illius dicta laudantur.
judged. Of this for deeds, of that words are praised.
say. One is praised for his deeds, the other for his words.

De me autem (ut jam cum utroque loquar)
From me but (that now with both I may speak)
Now of myself (that I may now speak with you both)—receive ye

sic habetote.

so have ye.

this.

3. Ego, si Scipionis desiderio me moveri negem,
I, if of Scipio by desire me to be moved I may deny,
If I were to deny that I am concerned for the death of Scipio,

quàm id rectè faciam, viderint sapientes;
how that rightly may make, they might see wise men;
however rightly I might act according to the opinion of some wise men;

sed certè mentiar. Moveor enim tali
but certainly I may feign. I am moved for such
I should certainly speak an untruth. For I am grieved at the

amico orbatus, qualis, ut arbitror, nemo umquam
of a friend deprived, such as, as I think, no one ever
loss of such a friend as, I think, will never be met with

erit; et, ut confirmare possum, nemo certè
will be; and, as to confirm I am able, no one certainly
again; and as I can affirm, never has been

fuit; sed non egeo medicinâ: me ipse consolor,
has been; but not I need medicine: me self I console,
before; but I do not need medicine: I can comfort myself;

et maximè illo solatio, quòd eo errore
and very greatly that by consolation, that that error
and especially by the consoling thought, that I am free from that

careo, quo, amicorum decessu, plerique
I want, which, of friends by the departure, most
error by which many are accustomed to be afflicted at the death of

angi solent: nihil enim mali
to be afflicted are accustomed: nothing for of evil
their friends: for I do not consider that

accidisse Scipioni puto: mihi accidit, si
to have happened to Scipio I think: to me happened, if
any evil has happened to Scipio: if there be evil to any,

quid accidit; suis autem incommodis gravitèr
any thing happened; own but disadvantages heavily
it is to me; but to be deeply distressed at one's own

angi, non amicum, sed seipsum amantis est.
to be troubled, not a friend, but himself of loving is.
evils, is not the part of a friend, but of one who loves himself.

Cum illo verò quis neget actum esse præclarè?
 With him but who will deny done to be very clearly?
Who indeed will deny that he was in every thing preeminent?

nisi enim, quod ille minimè putabat,
 unless for, which he least was thinking,
unless indeed, what he never thought of, he desired to live for

immortalitatem optare vellet, quid non est
 immortality to wish he might be willing, what not is
ever, what is there which is accessible to mortals, that he did not

adeptus, quod homini fas esset optare? qui
 having gained, which to man lawful might be to wish? who
acquire *who*

summam spem civium, quam de eo jam puero
 chief hope of citizens, which from him now a boy
when a boy raised the expectations of the citizens concerning himself,

habuerant, continuò adolescens incredibili virtute
 they had had, immediately a young man incredible with virtue
and when he was grown up, by an incredible degree of virtue even

superavit; qui consulatum petivit
 he went beyond; who the consulate sought
went beyond their expectations; who never sought the consulship,

numquam, factus est consul bis; primùm ante
 never, made is consul twice; first before
but was twice created consul; first, before the

tempus; iterùm sibi, suo tempore Reipublicæ
 time; again to himself, own in time for the Republic
usual age; again, in proper time as concerned himself, but almost

pœnè serò: qui, duabus urbibus eversis,
 almost late: who, two cities overthrown,
too late as concerned the state: who has put a stop not only to pre-

inimicissimis huic imperio, non modò præsentia,
 most hostile this to empire, not only present,
sent but to future wars, by the overthrow of two cities most hostile

verùm etiam futura bella delevit. Quid dicam
 but also future wars blotted out. What I may say
to this republic. Why need I speak

de moribus facillimis? de pietate in matrem?
 from manners most easy? from piety in mother?
of his most amiable manners? of his piety to his mother?

liberalitate in sorores? bonitate in suos? justitiâ
 liberality in sisters? goodness in own? justice
his liberality to his sisters? his goodness to his friends? his jus-

in omnes? nota sunt vobis: quàm autem
 in all? known are to you: how but
tice to every one? these are well known to you: how dear he was

civitati carus fuerit, mœrore funeris indicatum
 to the state dear he may have been, by grief of funeral indicated
to the state, was manifested by the sorrow displayed at his fu-

est. Quid igitur hunc paucorum annorum accessio
 is. What therefore him a few of years addition
neral. What increase of happiness could the addition of a few years

juvare potuisset? senectus enim, quamvis non
 to assist might have been able? old age for, although not
have bestowed upon him? for old age, although it may not

sit gravis, ut memini Catonem anno antè quàm
 may be heavy, as I remembered Cato year before than
be burdensome, as I remember Cato having discoursed upon with

mortuus est, mecum et cum Scipione disserere, tamen
 dead he is, me with and with Scipio to discourse, yet
me and Scipio the year before he died, yet it impairs that vigour

aufert eam viriditatem, in quâ etiamnum erat Scipio.
 takes away that greenness, in which even yet was Scipio.
which Scipio possessed even to the last.

Quamobrem vita quidem talis fuit, vel fortunâ, vel
 Wherefore life indeed such has been, or from fortune, or
Wherefore such was his life, that it could receive no further

gloriâ, ut nihil posset accedere; moriendi
 from glory, that nothing might be able to approach; of dying
addition either from fortune or glory; and the

autem sensum celeritas abstulit: quo de
 but sense quickness took away: which from
suddenness of his death took away all sense of pain: concerning

genere mortis difficile dictu est; quid homines
 kind of death difficult in saying is; what men
this kind of death it is difficult to speak; what men suspect,

suspicientur, videtis. Hoc tamen verè licet dicere,
 may suspect, you see. This yet truly is lawful to say,
you see. This however may be truly said, that

Publio Scipioni, ex multis diebus, quos in vitâ
 to Publius Scipio, from many days, which in life
of the many glorious and happy days, which Scipio beheld in the
 celeberrimos lætissimosque viderit, illum diem
 most celebrated most joyful and may have seen, that day
course of his life, that was the most glorious day of all, when
 clarissimum fuisse, cùm, senatu dimisso,
 most clear to have been, when, senate dismissed,
at the dismissal of the senate, he was conducted to his home in
 domum reductus ad vesperum est à Patribus
 home led back to evening is by Fathers
the evening by the Senators and by the ambassadors from
 conscriptis, à Populi Romani sociis et Latinis,
 enrolled, by of People Roman companions and Latins,
Latium and the allies of the Romans, the very day before his
 pridie quàm excessit è vitâ: ut ex
 the day before that he departed from life: that from
death: that from

tam alto dignitatis gradu ad superos videatur
 so high of dignity step to upper may be seen
so high a step of honor he seemed rather to ascend to the Gods
 potiùs, quàm ad inferos pervenisse. Neque
 rather, than to lower to have come through. Nor
than to descend to the grave. For I

enim assentior iis, qui hæc nuper disserere cœperunt,
 for I assent to those, who these lately to discourse began,
cannot agree with those, who have recently begun to teach, that
 cum corporibus simul animos interire, atque omnia
 with bodies together minds to perish, and all
the mind perishes at the same time as the body, and that our
 morte deleri.
 by death to be blotted out.
whole being is extinguished by death.

4. Plus apud me antiquorum auctoritas valet, vel
 More at me of the ancients authority prevails, or
I rather bow to the authority of the ancients, or of our
 nostrorum majorum, qui mortuis tam religiosa jura
 our of greater, who to the dead so religious laws
own ancestors, who instituted religious rites and observances for the

tribuerunt, quod non fecissent profectò, si
 have given, which not they would have made indeed, if
 dead, which they would not indeed have done if they believed that

nihil ad eos pertinere arbitrarentur; vel eorum,
 nothing to them to belong they might think; or of those,
 they had no interest in anything; or of those,

qui in hâc terrâ fuerunt, magnamque Græciam (quæ
 who in this earth have been, great and Greece (which
 who have dwelt in this country, and have instructed by their insti-

nunc quidem deleta est, tum florebat) institutis
 now indeed blotted out is, then was flourishing) by institutes
 tutes and precepts that great Greece, (which is now destroyed, but

et præceptis suis erudierunt; vel ejus, qui
 and by precepts their own they instructed; or of him, who
 which then flourished;) or of him, who was

Apollinis oraculo sapientissimus est judicatus, qui
 of Apollo by the oracle most wise is judged, who
 pronounced by the oracle of Apollo to be the wisest of men, who

non tum hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed idem
 not then this, then that, as in most, but the same
 did not at one time say this, at another that, as too many phi-

dicebat semper, Animos hominum esse divinos,
 was saying always, Minds of men to be divine,
 losophers do, but always said the same, That the minds of men are

iisque, cum è corpore excessissent,
 to them and, when from the body they might have departed,
 divine, and that to them, when they have departed from the body,

reditum in cœlum patere, optimoque et justissimo
 a return in heaven to be open, best and and most just
 there is open a return to heaven, and that return is most ready

cuique expeditissimum. Quod item Scipioni
 to every one most speedy. Which also to Scipio
 to the most virtuous and the most just. This also appeared to

videbatur, qui quidem quasi præ sagiret, perpaucis
 was seen, who indeed as if he might presage, very few
 Scipio, who indeed as if he had had a presentiment, a very few

ante mortem diebus, cum et Philus et Manilius
 before death days, when and Philus and Manilius
 days before his death, when Philus and Manilius and many

adessent, et alii plures, tuque etiam, Scævola,
might be present, and others more, thou and also, O Scævola,
others were present, and you also, Scævola, had come with

mecum venisses, triduum disseruit de
me with mightst have come, three days discoursed from
me, discoursed for three days concerning the Re-

Republicâ: cujus Disputationis fuit extremum ferè
the Republic: which of Disputation has been the last almost
public: the close of which discourse was on the Immortality

de Immortalitate Animorum: quæ se in quiete
from Immortality of Minds: which himself in quiet
of the Soul: which he said that he had

per visum ex Africano audisse dicebat.
through a vision from Africanus to have heard he was saying.
heard, in a dream, from Africanus.

Id si ita est, ut optimi cujusque animus in morte
That if so is, that the best of every one the mind in death
If it indeed be so, that the soul of every virtuous man readily flies

facillimè evolet, tamquam è custodiâ vinculisque
most easily may fly out, as if from custody bonds and
out of the body at death, as if from custody and bonds of the

corporis; cui censemur cursum ad Deos
of the body; to whom we think the course to the Gods
body; who can we imagine to have had a more ready

faciliorem fuisse quàm Scipioni? Quocirca, mœrere
more easy to have been than to Scipio? Wherefore, to grieve
course to heaven than Scipio? Wherefore, I fear to

hoc ejus eventu, vereor, ne invidi magis quàm
this of him event, I fear, not of envious more than
grieve for this his death, lest I should appear rather envying than

amici sit. Sin autem illa veriora, ut idem
of a friend may be. But if but those more true, that the same
having loved him. But on the other hand, if it be true that the

interitus sit animorum et corporum, nec ullus
destruction may be of minds and of bodies, nor any
same destruction awaits the mind and the body, and that no sense

sensus maneat; ut nihil boni est in morte, sic
sense may remain; as nothing of good is in death, so
remains; as there is nothing good in death, so

certe nihil mali: sensu enim amisso, fit
 certainly nothing of evil: sense for being lost, it is made
 certainly there is nothing evil: for when all sense is lost, it be-

idem, quasi natus non esset omninò: quem tamen
 the same, as if born not might be altogether: whom yet
 comes the same as if he had not been born at all: for whose birth

esse natum et nos gaudemus, et hæc civitas, dum
 to be born and we rejoice, and this state, while
 we rejoice, however; and this state as long as it exists will have

erit, lætabitur. Quamobrem cum illo quidem (ut
 it will be, will rejoice. Wherefore with him indeed (as
 cause to rejoice. Wherefore with him indeed, (as I have

supra dixi) actum optimè est; mecum incommodiùs,
 above I said) done best is; me with more inconvenient,
 said above,) every thing has been well; to me is the disadvantage,

quem fuerat æquius, ut priùs introïeram, sic priùs
 whom had been more equal, as first I had entered, so before
 that it would have been more regular, as I first came into life, so

exire de vitâ: sed tamen recordatione nostræ
 to go out from life: but yet recollection our
 I should first have left it: but yet I so far enjoy the recollection

amicitiæ sic fruor, ut beatè vixisse videar,
 of friendship so I enjoy, that happily to have lived I may be seen,
 of our friendship, that I seem to have lived happily, because I

quia cum Scipione vixerim: quocum mihi
 because with Scipio I may have lived: whom with to me
 have lived with Scipio: for we have had

conjuncta cura de re publicâ, et de privatâ fuit;
 conjoined care from thing public, and from private has been;
 the same interests both in public and in private affairs;

quocum et domus, et militia communis, et id,
 whom with and house, and war common, and that,
 I have lived with him in the same house, and served in the same

in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum,
 in which is all force of friendship, of wishes,
 wars; and, what is the full strength of friendship, there has been

studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio.
 of studies, of opinions chief agreement.
 the completest harmony in our wishes, our studies, and our opinions.

Itaque non tam ista me sapientiæ, quam modò
 Therefore not so that me of wisdom, which just now
 Therefore I am not so much delighted with that reputation for

Fannius commemoravit, fama delectat, falsa præsertim,
 Fannius related, fame delights, false especially,
 wisdom, which Fannius has now mentioned, especially as it is un-

quàm quòd amicitiae nostræ memoriā spero
 than because of friendship our memory I hope
 founded, as I am with the hope that the memory of our friendship

sempiternam fore: idque mihi eò magis est
 eternal about to be: that and to me thus more is
 will be eternal: and that is to me the more delight-

cordi, quòd ex omnibus seculis vix tria, aut
 to heart, because from all ages scarcely three, or
 ful, that of all ages scarcely three or four instances of equal

quattuor nominantur paria amicorum: quo in genere
 four are named equal of friends: which in kind
 friendship can be named: in which class I

sperare videor Scipionis et Lælii amicitiam notam
 to hope I am seen of Scipio and Lælius friendship known
 hope that the friendship of Scipio and Lælius will be known to

posteritati fore.
 to posterity to be about to be.
 posterity.

Fannius. Istud quidem, Læli, ita necesse est:
 That indeed, O Lælius, so necessary is:
 It is necessary indeed, Lælius, that it should be:

sed quoniam amicitiae mentionem fecisti, et sumus
 but since of friendship mention thou madest, and we are
 but since you have made mention of friendship, as we are now at

otiosi, pergratum mihi feceris (spero
 leisurely, very agreeable to me thou mightst have made (I hope
 leisure, you would perform an acceptable service to me (I hope also

item Scævola) si, quemadmodum soles
 also to Scævola) if, as thou art accustomed
 to Scævola) if, as you are accustomed on other subjects, when it is

de ceteris rebus, cùm ex te quærantur, sic de
 from other things, when from thee are sought, so from
 requested of you, you would also discourse concerning friendship;

amicitiâ disputaris, quid sentias, qualem
 friendship thou discourest, what thou mayest think, such as
stating what you think of it, and how you estimate it, and what
 existimes, quæ præcepta des.
 thou mayest esteem, what precepts thou mayest give.
precepts you would give for it.

Scævola. Mihi verò pergratum erit; atque
 To me indeed very agreeable it will be; and
It will indeed be very agreeable to me: and

id ipsum, cùm tecum agere conarer, Fannius
 that self, when thee with to act I may attempt, Fannius
indeed Fannius has anticipated me in the request I was about to

antevertit: quamobrem utrique nostrum gratum
 has prevented: wherefore to both of us agreeable
make: you will therefore perform a very acceptable

admodum feceris.
 very thou shalt have made.
service to us both.

5. *Lælius.* Ego verò non gravarer, si mihi ipse
 I but not may be burdened, if to me self
I would not indeed refuse if I thought myself

confiderem: nam et præclara res est, et sumus,
 I might confide: for and very clear thing is, and we are,
equal to it: for it is indeed a most delightful subject, and we

ut dixit Fannius, otiosi; sed quis ego sum? aut
 as said Fannius, leisurely; but who I am? or
are, as Fannius has said, at leisure; but who am I? or

quæ in me est facultas? doctorum est ista
 what in me is faculty? of the learned is that
what faculty have I? it is indeed a custom with

consuetudo, eaque Græcorum, ut iis ponatur
 custom, that and of the Greeks, that to them may be put
the learned philosophers of Greece, that a question is proposed to

de quo disputent quamvis subitò. Magnum
 from which they may dispute although suddenly.
them on which they speak extemporaneously.

opus est, egetque exercitatione
 work is, wants and exercise
great task, and requires a considerable degree of

Quamobrem quæ disputari de Amicitia
Wherefore which to be discoursed from Friendship
Wherefore whatever may be said on Friendship, I think you

possunt, ab eis, censeo, petatis, qui ista
they are able, from them, I think, you may ask, who those
should inquire of those who profess such talents for dis-

profitentur: ego vos hortari tantum possum, ut
profess: I you to exhort only I am able, that
cussion: I can only exhort you to prefer friendship to all

amicitiam omnibus rebus humanis antepontis:
friendship all to things human you may prefer:
other human goods:

nihil est enim tam naturæ aptum, tam conveniens
nothing is for so to nature fitted, so convenient
for there is nothing so adapted to our nature, so well calculated

ad res vel secundas, vel adversas. Sed hoc primum
to things or prosperous, or adverse. But this first
for prosperity or adversity. But this I think in

sentio, nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse;
I think, unless in goods friendship to be not to be able;
the first place, that friendship can only subsist between the good;

neque id ad vivum resco, ut illi, qui hæc
nor that to living I cut down, as they, who these
nor do I confine it to the living, as they do, who have discoursed

subtilius disserunt, fortasse verè, sed ad communem
more nicely discourse, perhaps truly, but to common
with more subtlety on this subject, perhaps with truth, but little to

utilitatem parum: negant enim, quemquam virum
utility little: they deny for, any man
public utility: for they deny that any man can be good,

bonum esse, nisi sapientem. Sit ita sanè: sed
good to be, unless wise. It may be so indeed: but
unless he be wise. It may be so indeed: but

eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis
that wisdom they interpret, which as yet mortal
they interpret that wisdom to be such as no mortal ever yet pos-

nemo est consecutus; nos autem ea, quæ sunt
no one is having followed together; we but those, which are
sessed; but we ought to consider those

in usu, vitæque communi, non ea, quæ finguntur, aut
 in use, life and common, not those, which are feigned, or
things which are of use, and applicable to the purposes of life, not those

optantur, spectare debemus: numquam ego dicam
 wished for, to look at we owe: never I may say
which are imagined or only wished for: I can never say that Caius

Caium Fabricium, Marcum Curium, Titum
 Caius Fabricius, Marcus Curius, Titus
Fabricius, Marcus Curius, Titus Coruncanius, whom our ancestors

Coruncanium, quos sapientes nostri maiores judicabant,
 Coruncanius, whom wise our greater were judging,
pronounced to be wise men, were wise according to the principle

ad istorum normam fuisse sapientes. Quare
 to of those rule to have been wise. Wherefore
laid down by those philosophers. Let them

sibi habeant sapientiæ nomen et invidiosum,
 to themselves they may have of wisdom name and invidious,
however keep to themselves their invidious and obscure definition of

et obscurum; concedantque, ut hi boni viri
 and obscure; they may grant and, that these good men
wisdom; but let them concede, that these were indeed

fuerint. Ne id quidem facient: negabunt,
 may have been. Not that indeed they will make: they will deny,
good men. But that indeed they will not do: they will deny,

id, nisi sapienti, posse concedi. Agamus
 that, unless to a wise man, to be able to be granted. We may do
that this can be conceded unless to a wise man. Let us then

igitur pingui Minervâ, ut aiunt. Qui ita se
 therefore gross with Minerva, as they say. Who so themselves
reason on plain principles of common sense. They who so con-

gerunt, ita vivunt, ut eorum probetur fides,
 carry, so live, that of them may be approved faith,
duct themselves, so live, that their fidelity, their integrity, their

integritas, æquitas, liberalitas; nec sit in illis ulla
 integrity, equity, liberality; nor may be in them any
equity, their liberality are manifest; in whom there is no cov-

cupiditas, vel libido, vel audacia; sintque magnâ
 cupidity, or lust, or boldness; they may be and great
tousness, nor lust, nor boldness; who are of decided

constantiâ, ut ii fuerunt, modò quos nominavi;
 of constancy, as those have been, just now whom I named;
firmness, as were those whom I have just now named;

hos viros bonos, ut habiti sunt, sic etiam appellandos
 these men good, as had are, so also to be called
as they are esteemed good men, so also we think that they may be

putemus; quia sequantur (quantum homines
 we may think; because they may follow (as much as men
called good; because they follow (as far as men are able)

possunt,) naturam, optimam benè vivendi ducein:
 are able,) nature, best well of living leader:
nature, the best guide of virtuous life:

sic enim mihi perspicere videor, ita natos esse nos,
 so for to me to perceive I am seen, so born to be us,
for so I seem to observe, that we were born, so that there should

ut inter omnes esset societas quædam; major
 as between all might be society some; greater
be a certain union among us all; but

autem, ut quisque proximè accederet: itaque
 but, as every one most nearly might approach: therefore
greater in proportion as every one is nearer to another: citizens

cives potiores, quàm peregrini; et propinqui, quàm
 citizens better, than foreigners; and relations, than
therefore are nearer than foreigners; and relations, than

alieni: cum his enim amicitiam natura ipsa
 strangers: with these for friendship nature self
strangers: for with these, nature itself has produced friendship,

peperit, sed ea non satis habet firmitatis;
 brought forth, but that not enough has of firmness;
but it has not enough stability;

namque hoc præstat amicitia propinquitati, quòd
 for in this stands before friendship relationship, because
for in this friendship is better than relationship, because benevolence

ex propinquitate benevolentia tolli potest,
 from relationship benevolence to be taken away is able,
may be taken away from relationship, but it can never be taken

ex amicitia non potest: sublatâ enim benevolentia,
 from friendship not is able: being taken away for benevolence,
away from friendship: for when benevolence is removed,

amicitiæ nomen tollitur, propinquitas manet.
 of friendship the name is taken away, relationship remains.
the very name of friendship is gone, but relationship remains.

Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc
 How great but the force of friendship may be, from this
But the greatness of the power of friendship is principally to be
 intelligi maximè potest, quòd ex infinitâ
 to be understood chiefly is able, that from infinite
inferred from this, that from the infinite society of the human
 societate generis humani, quam conciliavit ipsa
 society of the kind human, which conciliated self
race, which nature itself has created, the matter is so con-
 natura, ita contracta res est, et adducta in
 nature, so contracted thing is, and led to in
tracted, and brought into narrow compass, that all kindness
 angustum, ut omnis caritas aut inter duos, aut
 narrow, that all charity or between two, or
of feeling should be concentrated in two or a few
 inter paucos jungeretur.
 between few might be joined.
friends.

6. Est autem amicitia nihil aliud, nisi omnium
 Is but friendship nothing other, unless all
But friendship is nothing else than the most complete
 divinarum humanarumque rerum, cum benevolentia
 divine human and of things, with benevolence
agreement of all divine and human things, conjoined with sentiments
 et caritate, summa consensio: quâ quidem haud
 and charity, chief agreement: which indeed not
of benevolence and charity; than which indeed I
 scio, an, exceptâ sapientiâ, nihil quicquam
 I know, whether, excepted wisdom, nothing anything
know not, whether, with the exception of wisdom, any greater
 melius homini sit à Diis immortalibus datum:
 better to men may be from Gods immortal given:
blessing can be given to man by the immortal Gods:

divitias alii præponunt, bonam alii valitudinem,
 riches others place before, good others health,
some prefer riches, some good health, others power, others honors,

alii, potentiam, alii honores, multi etiam voluptates :
 others, power, others honors, many also pleasures :
many also prefer pleasures :

beluarum hoc quidem extremum est : illa autem
 of beasts this indeed the last is : those but
this last is the desire of brute beasts : but those above

superiora, caduca et incerta, posita non tam in
 superior, perishing and uncertain, placed not so in
named, being perishing and uncertain, do not depend on our own

nostris consiliis, quàm in fortunæ temeritate. Qui
 our counsels, as in of fortune rashness. Who
counsels, so much as on the accidents of fortune. They,

autem in virtute summum bonum ponunt, præclare
 but in virtue highest good place, very clearly
however, who place their chief good in virtue, act indeed most

illi quidem : sed hæc ipsa virtus amicitiam et
 they indeed : but this self virtue friendship and
wisely : but this virtue itself produces and preserves

gignit, et continet ; nec sine virtute amicitia esse
 produces, and contains ; nor without virtue friendship to be
friendship ; nor can friendship indeed by any means

ullo pacto potest. Jam virtutem ex consuetudine
 any by condition is able. Now virtue from custom
exist without virtue. Now let us interpret virtue from the

vitæ sermonisque nostri interpretemur ; nec eam,
 of life of discourse and our we may interpret ; nor it,
custom of life and of ordinary language ; and not

ut quidam docti, verborum magnificentiâ metiamur ;
 as some learned, of words by magnificence we may measure ;
measure it, as some learned philosophers, by magnificence of words ;

virosque bonos eos, qui habentur, numeremus,
 men and good those, who are had, we may number,
and let us reckon as good men, those who are generally so thought, the

Paullos, Catones, Gallos, Scipiones, Philos ; his
 Paulli, Catos, Galli, Scipios, Phili ; with these
Paulli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Phili ; ordinary

communis vita contenta est ; eos autem omittamus,
 common life contented is ; those but we may omit,
life is content with such as these ; but we may pass over those,

qui omninò nusquam reperiuntur. Tales igitur
 who altogether nowhere are found. Such therefore
 who are nowhere to be found. Among such men,

inter viros amicitia tantas opportunitates habet,
 among men friendship so great opportunities has,
 therefore, friendship possesses greater opportunities of development

quantas vix queo dicere. Principio, Cui
 how great scarcely I am able to say. In the beginning, to whom
 than I can well describe. In the first place, what

potest esse vita vitalis, ut ait Ennius, qui non in
 is able to be life lively, as says Ennius, who not in
 interest can there be in life, says Ennius, to him who does not

amici mutuâ benevolentia conquiescat? Quid
 of a friend mutual benevolence may rest together? What
 repose on the mutual benevolence of a friend? What

dulcius, quàm habere, quicum omnia audeas
 more sweet, than to have, whom with all thou mayst dare
 is more pleasant than to have one with whom you speak as freely

sic loqui, ut tecum? Quis esset tantus fructus
 so to speak, as thee with? What might be so great fruit
 as to yourself? What is the great advantage of

in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes, qui illis
 in prosperous things, unless thou mightst have, who in them
 prosperity, if you have not a friend, who partakes in your

æquè, ac tu ipse, gauderet? adversas verò ferre
 equally, as thou self, might rejoice? adverse but to bring
 joy? and very painful is it to

difficile esset sinè eo, qui illas gravius etiam,
 difficult might be without him, who them more heavily also,
 bear adversity without one who deeply feels it with

quàm tu, ferret: denique ceteræ res, quæ
 than thou, might bring: finally other things, which
 you. In short, other things, which are

expetuntur, opportunæ sunt singulæ rebus ferè
 are sought for, fit are each to things almost
 sought after, are each adapted to some peculiar

singulis; divitiæ, ut utare; opes, ut
 each; riches, that thou mayst use; power, that
 purpose; riches, that they may be used; power, to

colare; honores, ut laudare
 thou mayst be cultivated; honors, that thou mayst be praised;
create respect; honors, to procure praise;

voluptates, ut gaudeas; valitudo, ut dolore
 pleasures, that thou mayst rejoice; health, that pain
pleasures, to give delight; health, that you may be

careas, et muneribus fungare
 thou mayst want, and gifts thou mayst discharge
without pain, and that you may discharge the bodily

corporis: amicitia res plurimas continet; quoquò
 of the body: friendship things most contains; wherever
functions: but friendship comprehends every thing; wherever

te verteris, præstò est, nullo loco
 thee thou shalt have turned, at hand is, no from place
you turn yourself, it is at hand, it is not excluded from

excluditur, numquam intempestiva, numquam molesta
 is excluded, never unseasonable, never troublesome
any place, it is never out of season, it is never weary-

est: itaque non aquâ, non igni, ut aiunt, pluribus
 is: therefore not water, not fire, as they say, more
ing: therefore we cannot, as it is said, make use of fire and water for

locis utimur, quàm amicitia: neque ego nunc
 in places we use, than friendship: nor I now
a greater variety of purposes than friendship: but I am not now

de vulgari, aut de mediocri (quæ tamen ipsa et
 from common, or from moderate (which yet self and
speaking of a vulgar and measured friendship (even this however

delectat et prodest) sed de verâ et perfectâ
 delights and profits) but from true and perfect
has its pleasures and its advantages), but of a true and perfect

loquor, qualis eorum, qui pauci nominantur, fuit;
 I speak, such as of those, who few are named, has been;
friendship, as was that of those few whom we named;

nam et secundas res splendidiore facit amicitia,
 for and prosperous things more splendid makes friendship,
for friendship makes even prosperity more bright, and by dividing

et adversas partiens communicansque leviores.
 and adverse partaking communicating and lighter.
and partaking griefs makes sorrow more light.

7. Cùmque plurimas et maximas commoditates

When and most and greatest advantages
And since friendship comprehends so many, and such great

amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum præstat
 friendship may contain, then that doubtless stands before
advantages, it certainly exceeds also all other blessings, inasmuch

omnibus, quòd bonâ spe præluet in posterum:
 all, that good with hope it shines before in future:
as it gives a bright hope for the future:

nec debilitari animos, aut cadere patitur. Verùm
 nor to be weakened minds, or to fall suffers. But
and it suffers not the spirits to droop or be dejected. But

etiam amicum qui intuetur, tamquam exemplar
 also a friend who looks upon, as if copy
moreover, he who looks upon a friend, sees as it were an image of

aliquod intuetur sui: quocirca et absentes adsunt,
 some looks upon of himself: wherefore and absent are at
himself: and thus the absent become present,

et egentes abundant, et imbecilles valent, et
 and wanting abound, and weak are strong and
the destitute abound, and the weak become powerful; and what

quod difficilius dictu est, mortui vivunt: tantus
 which more difficult in saying is, dead live: so great
seems most improbable, the dead are brought to life: so great

eos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur
 them honor, memory, desire follows
honor and such lively recollection pursues departed

amicorum: ex quo illorum beata mors videtur;
 of friends: from which of them blessed death is seen;
friends: so that the death of those seems happy;

horum vita laudabilis: quòd si eximeris
 of these life laudable: that if thou mayst have taken out
and the life of these praiseworthy: for if you take away from the

ex naturâ rerum benevolentia conjunctionem; nec
 from nature of things of benevolence conjoining; nor
nature of things the union of benevolence; no

domus ulla, nec urbs stare poterit; ne agri
 house any, nor city to stand might be able; not of a field
family, and no state could possibly subsist; there would

quidem cultus permanebit: id si minùs
indeed culture will remain: that if less
not indeed be any cultivation of the earth: if there be difficulty

intelligitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque
is understood, how great the force of friendship of concord and
in comprehending this, still the great power and force of friendship

sit, ex dissensionibus atque discordiis percipi
may be, from dissensions and discords to be perceived
and concord may be perceived by considering the effect of dissention

potest; quæ enim domus tam stabilis, quæ tam
is able; what for house so stable, what so
and discord; for what family is so established, what state is so

firma civitas est, quæ non odiis atque dissidiis
firm state is, which not by hatreds and by discords
firm, that it may not be utterly overthrown by hatred and

funditus possit everti? ex quo, quantum
entirely may be able to be overthrown? from which, how much
discord? *from this then we may*

boni sit in amicitia, judicari potest.
of good may be in friendship, to be judged is able.
be able to ascertain how great is the good of friendship.

Agrigentinum quidem, doctum quendam virum,
Agrigentine indeed, learned certain man,
Mention is made indeed of a certain learned man of Agrigentum

carminibus Græcis vaticinatum ferunt, quæ in rerum
in verses Greek prophesying they bring, which in of things
saying in some Greek verses, that whatever exists in the nature

naturâ totoque mundo constarent, quæque
nature the whole and world might stand together, which and
of things and in the whole compass of the world, that whatever

moverentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare
might be moved, those to draw together friendship, to disperse
moves, that everything is cemented by friendship, or dispersed by

discordiam: atque hoc quidem omnes mortales et
discord: and this indeed all mortals and
discord: and this indeed all mortals understand, and in fact

intelligunt, et re probant. Itaque, si quando
understand, and in thing approve. Therefore, if when
approve. *Therefore, if at any*

aliquod officium exstitit amici in periculis aut
 some duty stood out of a friend in dangers or
time there is displayed the office of friendship in undergoing or

adeundis, aut communicandis, quis est, qui id non
 to be approached, or to be communicated, who is, who it not
in partaking dangers, who is there who does not extol it with the

maximis efferat laudibus? qui clamores totâ
 greatest may bring out by praises? what clamours the whole
loudest expressions of commendation? what shouts of applause

caveâ nuper in hospitis et amici mei, Marci
 in the cave lately in of host and of friend my, Marcus
lately filled the theatre, at the new play of my host and friend

Pacuvii, novâ Fabulâ, cùm, ignorante rege
 Pacuvius, new in a Fable, when, not knowing the king
Marcus Pacuvius, when the king not knowing which of the two

uter eorum esset Orestes, Pylades Orestem se
 whether of them might be Orestes, Pylades Orestes himself
was Orestes, Pylades insisted that he was Orestes that he might

esse diceret, ut pro illo necaretur; Orestes
 to be might say, that for him he might be killed; Orestes
be put to death instead of his friend; but Orestes,

autem, ita ut erat, Orestem se esse perseveraret?
 but, so as it was, Orestes himself to be persevered?
as indeed was the truth, persisted in affirming that he was Orestes?

stantes plaudebant in re fictâ: quid
 standing they were applauding in thing feigned: what
the multitude rose and applauded the fiction: what

arbitramur in verâ fuisse facturos? facilitè
 we think in true to have been to be about to make? easily
do we suppose they would have done, had the fact been real? nature

indicabat ipsa natura vim suam; cùm homines,
 was indicating self nature force own; when men,
itself easily manifested its own force; when men judged

quod ipsi facere non possent, id rectè
 which selves to make not might be able, that rightly
that that, which themselves were not able to do, was rightly done

fieri in altero judicarent. Hactenus mihi
 to be made in another they might judge. Thus far to me
by another. Thus far I seem

videor, de Amicitia quid sentirem, potuisse
I am seen, from Friendship what I might think, to have been able
to have been able to express what I think on the subject of

dicere. Siqua prætereà sunt (credo autem esse
to say. If any moreover are (I believe but to be
Friendship. If there be any thing more, (for I think there is much

multa) ab iis, si videbitur, qui ista disputant,
many) from them, if shall be seen, who those dispute,
more,) inquire, if you think fit, of those who are in the practice

quæritote.

seek ye.
of such discussions.

Fannius. Nos autem à te potiùs: quamquam

We but from thee rather: although
But we prefer hearing you: although I

etiam ab istis sæpè quæsi, et audiui, non invitus
also from those often I sought, and I heard, not unwilling
have also often inquired of those persons, and have listened to them,

equidem; sed aliud quoddam expetimus
indeed; but another certain we seek out
not indeed unwillingly; but we expect from you a different mode

filum orationis tuæ.

thread of discourse thy.
of treating the subject.

Scævola. Tum magis id diceres, Fanni,

Then more that thou mightst say, O Fannius,
You would say this with still greater confidence,

si nuper in hortis Scipionis, cùm est de Republicâ
if lately in gardens of Scipio, when is from the Republic
Fannius, if you had been present lately in the gardens of Scipio, when

disputatum, affuisses: qualis tum
disputed, thou mightst have been at: what then
the discussion was on the subject of the Republic: what an excellent

patronus justitiæ fuit contra accuratam orationem
patron of justice has been against accurate speech
advocate of justice was Lælius then, in opposition to the subtle

Phili!

of Philus!
arguments of Philus!

Fannius. Facile id quidem fuit, justitiam
 Easy that indeed has been, justice
It was indeed very easy for a most just man to
 justissimo viro defendere.
 most just for a man to defend.
defend the cause of justice.

Scævola. Quid amicitiam? nonne facile ei,
 What friendship? not easy to him,
And why not of friendship? is not this also as easy
 qui ob eam summâ fide, constantiâ, justitiâque
 who for it chief with faith, with constancy, with justice and
 to him, who on account of friendship kept with the greatest fidelity,
 servatam, maximam gloriam ceperit?
 kept, greatest glory may have taken?
justice and steadiness, has acquired a distinguished glory?

8. *Lælius.* Vim hoc quidem est afferre: quid
 Force this indeed is to bring to: what
This is indeed to compel me: for
 enim refert quâ me rogatione cogatis?
 for brings back what me by request you may compel?
what signifies by what means you may compel me?

cogitis certè: studiis enim generorum,
 you compel certainly: studies for of sons-in-law,
for certainly you do compel: for it is both difficult and unjust
 præsertim in re bonâ, cùm difficile est, tum ne
 especially in thing good, when difficult is, then not
 to oppose the wishes of sons-in-law, especially when those wishes
 æquum quidem, obsistere. Sæpissimè igitur mihi
 just indeed, to oppose. Most often therefore to me
are for what is good. It has often occurred to me,

de amicitia cogitanti, maximè illud considerandum
 from friendship thinking, most greatly that to be considered
 when I have been thinking on the subject of Friendship, that it is
 videri solet, Num propter imbecillitatem
 to be seen is accustomed, Whether on account of weakness
 to be considered, Whether friendship is sought after on account of
 atque inopiam desiderata sit amicitia, ut dandis,
 and want desired may be friendship, that to be given,
weakness and want, so that every one may receive from another,

recipiendisq[ue] meritis, quod quisque min[us] per
 to be received and deserts, which every one less through
by means of a system of mutual giving and receiving, that which
 se ipse posset, id acciperet ab alio,
 himself self might be able, that he might receive from another,
he is unable to procure for himself, and may in return bestow the
 vicissimq[ue] redderet? An esset hoc quidem
 in turn and might restore? Whether might be this indeed
same upon another. Or whether this might be indeed

proprium amicitia[rum]; sed antiquior et pulchrior,
 peculiar to friendship; but more ancient and more beautiful,
peculiar to friendship; but that there was another more remote

et magis à naturâ ipsâ profecta alia causa?
 and more from nature self having departed another cause?
and beautiful cause, and derived more immediately from nature itself?

amor enim (ex quo amicitia nominata) princeps
 love for (from which friendship named) chief
for love (from which friendship has its name) is the principal in-

est ad benevolentiam conjungendam: nam utilitates
 is to benevolence to be conjoined: for usefulnesses
gredient in the formation of benevolence: for advantage in-

quidem etiam ab iis percipiuntur sæpè, qui
 indeed also from those are perceived often, who
deed is derived even from those who are courted and revered

simulatione amicitia[rum] coluntur, et observantur
 by pretence of friendship are cultivated, and are observed
under pretence of friendship, and for mere motives of

causâ temporis. In amicitia autem nihil fictum,
 for the cause of time. In friendship but nothing feigned,
interest. But in friendship there is nothing

nihil simulatum; et quidquid in eâ est, id est
 nothing pretended; and whatever in it is, it is
feigned, nothing pretended; and whatever there is in it, is true

verum et voluntarium. Quapropter à naturâ mihi
 true and voluntary. Wherefore from nature to me
and voluntary. Friendship therefore seems to me

videtur potius, quàm ab indigentia, orta
 is seen rather, than from want, having sprung
to spring from nature rather than from want; and rather from the

amicitia, et applicatione magis animi cum quodam
friendship, and by application more of mind with some
application of the mind with a certain sense of loving, than from

sensu amandi, quàm cogitatione, quantum illa res
sense of loving, than with thought, how much that thing
any consideration of the advantage which may be derived

utilitatis esset habitura. Quod quidem quale
of utility might be about to have. Which indeed such as
from it. Which indeed, such as it

sit, etiam in bestiis quibusdam animadverti potest;
may be, also in beasts some to be perceived is able;
is, is also to be observed in some animals;

quæ ex se natos ita amant ad quoddam
which from themselves born so they love to some
which so love those which are born of them to a certain period,

tempus, et ab eis ita amantur, ut faciliè earum
time, and by them so are loved, that easily of them
and are so beloved by them, that their sense of attachment is

sensus appareat; quod in homine multò est evidentius.
sense may appear; which in man by much is more evident.
easily discerned; but in man this feeling is much more manifest.

Primum ex eâ caritate, quæ est inter natos et
First from that charity, which is between born and
First from that kindness which subsists between children and

parentes, quæ dirimi, nisi detestabili scelere,
parents, which to be torn asunder, unless detestable by wickedness,
parents, and which cannot be destroyed but by the most detestable

non potest; deinde, cùm similis sensus exstitit amoris,
not is able; thence, when like sense stood out of love,
wickedness; then, when a similar sense of love arises, if we

si aliquem nacti sumus, cujus cum moribus,
if any one having gained we are, of whom with manners,
have met with any one whose manners and disposition coincide

et naturâ congruamus, quòd in eo quasi lumen
and nature we agree, that in him as if light
with our own, because in him we seem to discern, as it were, some

aliquod probitatis et virtutis perspicere videamur:
some of probity and of virtue to perceive we may be;
light of probity and virtue:

nihil est enim amabilius virtute, nihil, quod
 nothing is for more amiable virtue, nothing, which
for there is nothing more amiable than virtue, nothing which more

magis alliciat ad diligendum; quippe cum propter
 more may allure to love; for when on account of
powerfully attracts love; for on account of virtue and

virtutem et probitatem, eos etiam, quos numquam
 virtue and probity, those also, whom never
probity, we do in some degree love those whom we have never

vidimus, quodam modo diligamus. Quis est, qui
 we saw, some by manner we may love. Who is, who
seen. Who is there that

Caï Fabricii, Marci Curii non cum caritate
 of Caius Fabricius, of Marcus Curius not with charity
does not regard with a degree of love and affection the memory

aliquâ, et benevolentia memoriam usurpet, quos
 some, and benevolence memory may use, whom
of Caius Fabricius, and Marcus Curius, whom he has never

numquam viderit? quis autem est, qui Tarquinium
 never hemay have seen? who but is, who Tarquinius
seen? and who is there that does not hate

Superbum, qui Spurius Cassium, Spurius Mælium
 Proud, who Spurius Cassius, Spurius Mælius
Tarquinius Superbus, Spurius Cassius, and Spurius

non oderit? Cum duobus ducibus de imperio
 not may have hated? With two leaders from empire
Mælius? We have contended with two generals in

in Italiâ decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale; ab
 in Italy contended, by Pyrrhus and by Hannibal; from
Italy for empire, with Pyrrhus and with Hannibal; to

altero, propter probitatem ejus, non nimis
 another, on account of probity of him, not too much
one of these, on account of his probity, our minds have been fa-

alienos animos habemus, alterum, propter
 foreign minds we have, another, on account of
vorably disposed; the other, on account of his cruelty, this state

crudelitatem, semper hæc civitas oderit.
 cruelty, always this state may have hated.
has always hated.

9. Quòd si tanta vis probitatis est, ut eam vel
 That if so great force of probity is, that it or
But if so great is the force of probity, that we love it

in eis, quos numquam vidimus, vel, quod majus est,
 in those, whom never we saw, or, which greater is,
even in those whom we have never seen, or, which is still more,

in hoste etiam diligamus; quid mirum, si animi
 in an enemy also we may love; what wonderful, if minds
even in an enemy; what wonder is it, if the

hominum moveantur, cum eorum, quibus cum usu
 of men may be moved, when of those, to whom with use
minds of men are moved, when they seem to discern virtue and

conjuncti esse possunt, virtutem et bonitatem perspicere
 conjoined to be able, virtue and goodness to discover
goodness in those with whom they may be connected in intimacy and

videantur? Quamquam confirmatur amor et beneficio
 may be seen? Although is confirmed love and a benefit
friendship? Although love is confirmed by benefits received, by

accepto, et studio perspecto, et consuetudine adjuncta;
 received, and study discovered, and custom joined to;
a zeal manifested for our welfare, and by long association;

quibus rebus ad illum primum motum animi et amoris
 which things to that first motion of mind and of love
which circumstances contributed to the first movements of the mind

adhibitis; admirabilis quædam exardescit benevolentia
 admitted; admirable some burns out of benevolence
to love; a certain wonderful strength of benevolence glows in

magnitudo: quam si qui putant ab imbecillitate
 greatness: which if who think from weakness
the breast: which if any persons imagine to arise from weak-

proficisci, ut sit, per quem quisque assequatur,
 to depart, that may be, by whom every one may follow to,
ness, in order that there may be one by whose means we may

quod desideret, humilem sanè relinquunt, et
 which he may desire, low indeed they leave, and
obtain that which is desirable, they *ate a very low,*

minimè generosum, ut ritia,
 least generous, as
and if I may so speak, a

quam ex inopiâ atque indigentia natam volunt:
 which from want and indigence born they are willing:
they represent as having been born from want and indigence:

quod si ita esset, ut quisque minimum in se
 which if so might be, as every one least in himself
but if this were true, in proportion as any one felt himself weak,
 esse arbitraretur, ita ad amicitiam esset aptissimus;
 to be might think, so to friendship he might be most fit;
he would be considered as better calculated for friendship;

quod longè secus est. Ut enim quisque sibi
 which far otherwise is. As for every one to himself
but this is far from being the case. For in proportion as any one

plurimum confidit, et ut quisque maximè virtute
 most confides, and as every one most greatly by virtue
has confidence in himself, and as any one is most fortified by the

et sapientiâ sic munitus est, ut nullo egeat,
 and by wisdom so fortified is, that none he may need,
principles of virtue and wisdom, so that he does not stand in need of

suaque omnia in se ipso posita judicet, ita
 his own and all in himself self placed he may judge, so
anything, and is sensible that all which he has is in and from himself,

in amicitia expetendis colendisque maximè
 in friendships to be sought to be cultivated and most greatly
in that degree is he distinguished in the selection and cultivation of

excellit: quid enim Africanus indigens mei? Minimè
 he excels: what for Africanus wanting of me? Least
friendships: for what did Africanus want from me? Nothing

herclè; ac ne ego quidem illius; sed ego
 by Hercules; and not I indeed of him; but I
indeed: nor did I want anything from him; but I loved

admiratione quâdam virtutis ejus, ille vicissim opinione
 by admiration some of virtue of him, he by turns by opinion
him through an admiration of his virtue, and he on the other hand,

fortassè nonnullâ, quam de meis moribus habebat,
 perhaps some, which from my manners he was having,
moved by some opinion which perhaps he had formed of my manners

me dilexit; auxit benevolentiam consuetudo.
 me loved; increased benevolence custom.
and habits, loved me; and habit strengthened our mutual friendship.

Sed quamquam utilitates multæ, et magnæ consecutæ
 But although usefulnesses many, and great having followed
But although many and great advantages have resulted from it, yet

sunt, non sunt tamen ab earum spe causæ diligendi
 are, not are yet from of them hope causes of loving
the motives to that friendship did not proceed from the hope of those

profectæ. Ut enim benefici liberalesque sumus,
 having proceeded. As for beneficent liberal and we are,
advantages. For as we are beneficent and liberal, not that

non ut exigamus gratiam (neque enim beneficium
 not that we may exact favour (nor for a benefit
we may thereby extort a favour in return (for we do not make a

fœneramur,) sed naturâ propensi ad liberalitatem
 we lend on interest,) but by nature inclined to liberality
market of benevolence), but we are by nature inclined to

sumus; sic amicitiam, non spe mercedis adducti,
 we are; so friendship, not by hope of reward led to,
liberality; so we think it desirable to cultivate friendship, not being

sed, quòd omnis ejus fructus in ipso amore inest,
 but, because all of it fruit in self love is in,
induced by the hope of any advantage, but because there is in friendship

expetendam putamus. Ab iis, qui
 to be sought out we think. From those, who
itself that satisfaction which is its own reward. They who refer all

pecudum ritu ad voluptatem omnia referunt,
 of cattle in the manner to pleasure all bring back,
motives to a desire of pleasure, after the manner of the brute creation,

longè dissentiunt; nec mirum: nihil enim
 far they dissent; nor wonderful: nothing for
differ very widely from these views; and no wonder: for they cannot

altum, nihil magnificum ac divinum, suspicere
 high, nothing magnificent and divine, to look up to
look up to any thing high, or magnificent, or divine, who have

possunt, qui suas omnes cogitationes abjecerunt
 are able, who their own all thoughts have cast away
directed all their thoughts downward to an object so low and so

in rem tam humilem, tamque contemtam: quamobrem
 in thing so low, so and despised: wherefore
contemptible: let us therefore

hos quidem ab hoc sermone removeamus: ipsi
 these indeed from this discourse we may remove: selves
dismiss from this discourse all thought of such reasoners: but

autem intelligamus, naturâ gigni sensum
 but we may understand, by nature to be produced a sense
we may perceive that nature produces a sentiment of attachment

diligendi et benevolentiae caritatem, factâ
 of loving and of benevolence charity, being made
and a feeling of friendship, when there is manifestation of the

significatione probitatis; quam qui appetiverunt,
 signification of probity; which who sought,
existence of good principle; and those who esteem this, apply

applicant sese et propius admovent, ut et usu
 apply themselves and nearer move to, that and use
themselves and seek a nearer acquaintance, that they may enjoy an

ejus, quem diligere cœperunt, fruantur, et moribus;
 of him, whom to love they began, they may enjoy, and manners;
intimacy with him whose moral qualities they have begun to love;

sintque pares in amore, et æquales
 they may be and alike in love, and equal
that they may be equals in reciprocal attachment, and become

propensioresque ad benè merendum, quàm ad
 more inclined and to well to deserve, than to
more disposed to deserve well, than to seek return of

repscendum. Atque hæc inter eos sit honesta
 to redemand. And this between them may be honorable
favours. And there arises an honorable contest between

certatio: sic et utilitates ex amicitia maximæ
 contest: so and usefulnesses from friendship greatest
them: and so the greatest advantages are derived from

capiuntur; et erit ejus ortus à naturâ, quàm
 are taken; and will be of it origin from nature, than
friendship; and having its origin in nature, and not in human

ab imbecillitate, et gravior, et verior: nam
 from weakness, and more heavy, and more true: for
weakness, it becomes more respectable and sincere: for if

si utilitas amicitias conglutinet, eadem commutata
 if usefulness friendships might cement, the same changed
utility cemented friendships, a change of circumstance would dis-

dissolveret: sed quia natura mutari non potest,
might dissolve: but because nature to be changed not is able,
solve them: but because nature is unchangeable, therefore true

idcirco veræ amicitiae sempiternæ sunt; ortum quidem
therefore true friendships everlasting are; origin indeed
friendships are everlasting; thus you see in-

amicitiæ videtis, nisi quid ad hæc fortè
of friendship you see, unless anything to these perhaps
deed the origin of friendship, unless you wish perchance for any
vultis.

you are willing:
thing further.

Fannius. Tu verò perge, Læli: pro hoc enim,
Thou but continue, O Lælius: for this for,
I beg you will proceed, Lælius: I take upon my-

qui minor est natu, meo jure respondeo.
who less is by birth, my by right I answer.
self to speak for Scævola, who is my junior.

Scævola. Rectè tu quidem: quamobrem audiamus.
Rightly thou indeed: wherefore we may hear.
You do rightly: therefore let us hear.

10. *Lælius.* Audite ergò, optimi viri, ea
Hear ye therefore, best O men, those
Hear then, my very good friends, what has

quæ sæpissimè inter me, et Scipionem de
which very often between me, and Scipio from
been very often talked over between me and Scipio on the subject

Amicitia disserebantur; quamquam ille quidem nihil
Friendship were discoursed; although he indeed nothing
of Friendship; although he indeed said, that nothing

difficilius esse dicebat, quàm amicitiam usque ad
more difficult to be was saying, than friendship even to
was more difficult than for a friendship to continue even to the

extremum vitæ permanere: nam, vel ut non
extreme of life to remain through: for, or that not
end of life: for, it often happens that

idem expediret utrique, incidere sæpè,
the same it might be expedient to both, to fall in often,
either the same objects are interesting to both parties, or that they

vel ut de republicâ non idem sentirent :
 or that from the republic not the same might think :
do not think alike on public affairs :

mutari etiam mores hominum sæpè dicebat,
 to be changed also manners of men often he was saying,
he said also that the manners of men often changed, at one time

aliàs rebus adversis, aliàs ætate ingravescente :
 otherwise things adverse, otherwise age pressing upon :
by the force of adversity, or at another by the pressure of age :

atque earum rerum exemplum ex similitudine
 and those of things example from likeness
he took also an illustration of these things from the circumstances

capiebat ineuntis ætatis, quòd summi puerorum
 he was taking entering upon of age, that chief of boys
of early life, showing that the strongest attachments of boys are often

amores sæpè unà cum prætextâ ponerentur :
 loves often together with puerile dress might be laid aside :
laid aside with their youthful dress :

sin autem ad adolescentiam perduxissent,
 but if but to youth they might have led through,
but if these friendships have been protracted to riper age, yet some-

dirimi tamen interdum contentione, vel
 to be torn asunder yet sometimes by contention, or
times by rivalry, either in matrimonial pursuits, or in some other

uxoriæ conditionis, vel commodi alicujus, quod
 matrimonial of condition, or of advantage some, which
circumstance, in which both cannot be equally

idem adipisci uterque non posset : quòd si qui
 the same to obtain both not might be able : that if who
successful : but if any have

longiùs in amicitia proveci essent, tamen sæpè
 further in friendship advanced might be, yet often
carried on their friendship yet further, still it is often destroyed,

labefactari, si in honoris contentionem
 to be weakened, if in of honor contention
if they chance to have any rivalry in the pursuit of public

incidissent : pestem enim majorem esse nullam
 they might have fallen in : plague for greater to be no
honors : and there cannot be a greater enemy to

amicitiis, quàm in plerisque pecuniæ cupiditatem;
 to friendships, than in most of money desire;
friendship among the generality of mankind, than the desire of money;

in optimis quibusque honoris certamen et gloriæ
 in best every of honor contest and of glory
among persons of high rank there exists a desire of honor and

ex quo inimicitias maximas sæpè inter amicissimos
 from which enmities greatest often among most friendly
glory, from which there often arise the greatest enmities even
 exstitisse.

Magna enim dissidia, et
 to have existed. Great for disagreements, and
between the best of friends. Great disagreements also, and those

plerumque justa nasci, cùm aliquid ab amicis,
 generally just to be born, when something from friends,
well founded, are produced when friends request from one

quod rectum non esset, postularetur; ut aut
 which right not might be, might be required; that either
another that which is not right; either that

libidinis ministri, aut adjuutores essent ad injuriam;
 of lust ministers, or helpers to might be to injury:
they may become ministers to lust, or assistants in doing injury to others:

quod qui recusarent, quamvis honestè id
 which who might refuse, although honestly it
and when they refuse, however honourably they may act in so doing,

facerent, jus tamen amicitiae deserere
 they might make, law yet of friendship to desert
yet by those with whom they decline to comply, they are considered

arguerentur ab iis, quibus obsequi nollent:
 might be proved by those, whom to follow they might be unwilling:
as having violated the laws of friendship:

illos autem, qui quidvis ab amico auderent
 those but, who anything from a friend might dare
but those who dare to demand anything of a friend, manifest by

postulare, postulatione ipsâ profiteri, omnia se
 to demand, by demand self to profess, all themselves
that very demand, that they themselves are ready to do anything

amici causâ esse facturos: eorum querelâ
 of a friend for the cause to be about to make: of those by complaint
for the sake of their friends: by such disagreements

inveteratas non modò familiaritates extingui
 inveterate not only familiarities to be extinguished
not only are long established friendships accustomed to be dissolved,
 solere, sed etiam odia gigni sempiterna.
 to be accustomed, but also hatreds to be produced everlasting.
but also unconquerable hatreds to be produced.

Hæc ita multa, quasi fata, impendere amicitii, ut
 These so many, as if fates, to hang over friendships, that
All these fatalities, as it were, hang over friendships; so that to
 omnia subterfugere non modò sapientiæ, sed etiam
 all to escape not only of wisdom, but also
escape them all, he said, appeared to him not only the result of
 felicitatis diceret sibi videri.
 of happiness he might say to himself to be seen.
wisdom, but also of peculiar good fortune.

11. Quamobrem id primùm videamus, si placet,
 Wherefore that first we may see, if it pleases,
Let us therefore in the first place inquire, if you please,
 quatenus amor in amicitia progredi debeat: num,
 how far love in friendship to advance may owe: whether,
how far love in friendship ought to proceed: whether,
 si Coriolanus habuit amicos, ferre contra patriam
 if Coriolanus had friends, to bring against country
if Coriolanus had possessed friends, they ought to have borne arms
 arma illi cum Coriolano debuere? Num Viscellinum
 arms they with Coriolanus owed? Whether Viscellinus
with Coriolanus against their country? Whether the friends of
 amici regnum appetentem, num Spurius Mælium
 friends kingdom seeking, whether Spurius Mælius
Viscellinus or of Spurius Mælius ought to have assisted them in
 debuerunt juvare? Tiberium quidem Gracchum
 owed to assist? Tiberius indeed Gracchus
aiming at the sovereignty? We saw indeed Tiberius Gracchus,
 rempublicam vexantem, à Quinto Tuberone
 the republic troubling, by Quintus Tubero
when disturbing the state, deserted by Quintus Tubero and his
 æqualibusque amicis derelictum videbamus. At
 equal and friends deserted we were seeing. But
intimate friends. But

Caius Blossius, Cumanus, hospes familiæ vestræ,
 Caius Blossius, of Cuma, a guest of family your,
 Caius Blossius, of Cuma, a guest of your family, Scævola,

Scævola, cùm ad me qui aderam Lænati et Rupilio
 O Scævola, when to me who was at Lænatus and Rupilius
 when he came to me, whilst I was sitting in council

consulibus in concilio, deprecatum venisset, hanc,
 consuls in council, to deprecate might have come, this,
 with Lænatus and Rupilius the consuls, to supplicate for

ut sibi ignoscerem, causam afferebat, quòd
 that to himself I might pardon, cause he was bringing to, that
 pardon, urged this as a reason, namely, that he

tanti Tiberium Gracchum fecisset, ut
 of so much Tiberius Gracchus he might have made, that
 was so strongly attached to Tiberius Gracchus, that

quidquid ille vellet, sibi faciendum
 whatever he might be willing, to himself to be made
 whatever Gracchus desired, he was bound to

putaret: tum ego: Etiamne, si te in
 he might think: then I: Also not, if thee in
 do: I then said: Suppose he had wished you to

Capitolium faces ferre vellet? Numquam, inquit,
 the Capitol torches to bring might wish? Never, he said,
 set fire to the Capitol? He never would have

voluisset id quidem: Sed, si
 he would have wished that indeed: But, if
 desired such a thing, he replied: But, suppose

voluisset? Paruissem. Videtis, quàm
 he might have wished? I might have obeyed. You see, how
 he had desired it? I should have complied. There was an

nefaria vox: et herclè ita fecit, vel plus etiam,
 wicked a voice: and by Hercules so he made, or more also,
 infamous avowal: and in truth so he actually did, or rather he

quàm dixit: non enim paruit ille Tiberii
 than he said: not for obeyed he of Tiberius
 went further than he said: for he did not obey the madness of

Gracchi temeritati, sed præfuit, nec se comitem
 Gracchus rashness, but has been before, nor himself companion
 Tiberius Gracchus, but he even went beyond it, nor was he so much

illius furoris, sed ducem præbuit. Itaque hâc
 of him of madness, but leader afforded. Therefore this
a companion of his schemes, as a leader of them. Therefore being

amentiâ, quæstione novâ perterritus, in Asiam
 by madness, by question new much terrified, in Asia
terrified by this madness, and alarmed at the idea of a new trial,

profugit, ad hostes se contulit, pœnas
 he fled away, to enemies himself brought, punishments
he fled into Asia, betook himself to the enemy, and suffered severe

reipublicæ graves justasque persolvit.

to the republic heavy just and he payed.

and just punishment for the injuries he had inflicted on the state.

Nulla est igitur excusatio peccati, si amici causâ

None is therefore excuse of sin, if of a friend for the cause

There is no excuse for sin therefore, even though you may sin for

peccaveris:

nam, cùm conciliatrix amicitiae
 thou shalt have sinned: for, when conciliator of friendship
the sake of a friend: for as an opinion of virtue has been the

virtutis opinio fuerit, difficile est, amicitiam
 of virtue opinion may have been, difficult is, friendship
procuring cause of friendship, it is difficult for friendship to continue,

manere, si à virtute defeceris.

Quòd si
 to remain, if from virtue thou mayest fall from. That if
if you fall away from virtue.

But if we

rectum statuerimus, vel concedere amicis

right we may have determined, or to yield together to friends
determine that it is right, either to grant to friends whatever they

quidquid velint, vel impetrare ab iis,

whatever they may be willing, or to obtain from them,
may desire, or to obtain from them whatever we may wish, we

quidquid velimus, perfectâ quidem sapientiâ

whatever we may be willing, perfect indeed wisdom
ought to be indeed perfectly wise, if there be no evil in that co-

simus, si nihil habeat res vitii: sed loquimur

we may be, if nothing may have thing of vice: but we speak
cession: but we are speak-

de iis amicis, qui ante oculos sunt, quos videmus,

from those friends, who before eyes are, whom we see,
ing of those friends who are before our eyes, whom we see, or

aut de quibus memoriam accepimus, aut quos novit
 or from whom memory we accepted, or whom knew
 whom we recollect, or with whom ordinary life is ac-
 vita communis: ex hoc numero nobis exempla
 life common: from this number to us examples
 quainted: from this number, examples are to be taken

sumenda sunt; et eorum quidem maximè,
 to be taken are; and of those indeed most greatly,
 for ourselves; and principally indeed of those who ap-

qui ad sapientiam proximè accedunt. Videmus
 who to wisdom most nearly approach. We see
 proach nearest to wisdom. We see that

Papum Æmilium Caio Luscino familiarem
 Papus Æmilius with Caius Luscinus familiar
 Papus Æmilius was a friend of Caius Luscinus (so we have

fuisse (sic à patribus accepimus) bis unà
 to have been (so from fathers we accepted) twice together
 heard from our fathers), that they were twice consuls together,

consules, et collegas in censurâ: tum et cum
 consuls, and colleagues in censorship: then and with
 and colleagues in the censorship: and at the same

iis, et inter se, conjunctissimos fuisse
 those, and between themselves, most conjoined to have been
 time, it is recollected, that Manlius Curius and Titus Corun-

Manlium Curium et Titum Coruncanium, memoriæ
 Manlius Curius and Titus Coruncanius, to memory
 canius were most intimate with them, and friendly among

proditum est: igitur ne suspicari quidem possumus,
 delivered is: therefore not to suspect indeed we are able,
 themselves: therefore we cannot even suspect that any one

quemquam horum ab amico quippiam contendisse,
 any one of these from a friend anything to have contended,
 of these would have requested anything from his friend, incon-

quod contra fidem, contra jusjurandum, contra
 which against faith, against an oath, against
 sistent with good, contrary to his oath, or injurious to

republicam esset: nam hoc quidem in talibus viris
 the republic might be: for this indeed in such men
 the state: for indeed to what purpose is it to say

serpit deinde res, quæ procliviùs ad perniciem, cùm
*creeps thence thing, which more steeply to destruction, when
 for matters of this kind creep on gradually; and when they have once*

semel cœpit, labitur. Videtis in tabellâ jam
*once began, slides. You see in tablet now
 commenced, they hasten to destruction. You see how great a change*

antè quanta sit facta labes, primò Gabiniâ
*before how great may be made a stain, first Gabinian
 has already been made in the manner of voting, first by the Ga-*

Lege, biennio autem pòst, Cassiâ. Videre jam
*by Law, two years but after, Cassian. To see now
 binian law, and two years after by the Cassian. I now seem to*

videor populum à senatu disjunctum multitudinisque
*I am seen people from senate disjoined of multitude and
 behold the people detached from the senate, and the greatest matters*

arbitrio res maximas agi. Plures enim
*by judgment things greatest to be done. More for
 managed by the decision of the multitude. For more per-*

discent, quemadmodùm hæc fiant, quàm
*will learn, after what manner these may be made, than
 sons will find, how these things have happened than by what means*

quemadmodùm his resistatur. Quorsum
*after what manner to these it may be resisted. Wherefore
 they may be resisted. To what purpose*

hæc? Quia sine sociis nemo
*these? Because without companions no one
 are these observations? Because without accomplices no one en-*

quidquam tale conatur. Præcipiendum est igitur
*anything such endeavours. To be taught is therefore
 deavours anything of this kind. The good therefore are to be*

bonis, ut, si in ejusmodi amicitias ignari
*to good, that, if in of that kind friendships ignorant
 taught, that if by any inadvertence they have fallen into friendships*

casu aliquo inciderint, ne existiment, ita
*by fall any may have fallen in, not they may think, so
 of this description, they ought not to consider themselves as so far*

se alligatos, ut ab amicis in magnâ aliquâ
*themselves bound to, that from friends in great any
 bound by them, that they may not desert their friends when they*

re peccantibus non discedant: improbis autem
 thing sinning not may depart: for the wicked but
are guilty of any serious offence: but punishment is ap-

poena statuenda est: nec verò minor iis,
 punishment to be appointed is: nor indeed less for those,
pointed for the wicked: nor less indeed for those who

qui sequuti erunt alterum, quàm iis, qui
 who having followed shall be another, than for those, who
have followed another, than for those who have themselves been the

ipsi fuerint impietatis duces. Quis clarior
 selves may have been of impiety leaders. Who more clear
leaders in wickedness. Who was more cele-

in Græciâ Themistocle; quis potentior? qui, cùm
 in Greece Themistocles; who more powerful? who, when
brated in Greece than Themistocles; who more powerful? who, when

imperator bello Persico servitute Græciam
 commander in war Persian from slavery Greece
as commander in the Persian war, he had delivered Greece from

liberâsset, propterque invidiam in exilium
 might have delivered, on account of and envy in banishment
slavery, and through envy had been sent into banishment, did not

pulsus esset, ingratae patriæ injuriam non tulit,
 driven might be, ungrateful of country injury not brought,
bear the injury of his ungrateful country as he ought to have

quam ferre debuit: fecit idem, quod viginti
 which to bring he owed: he made the same, which twenty
borne it: he did the same, as twenty years

annis antè apud nos fecerat Coriolanus. His
 years before among us had made Coriolanus. For these
before, Coriolanus had done among us. For

adjutor contra patriam inventus est nemo; itaque
 assistant against country found is no one; therefore
them no accomplice was found against their country; therefore

mortem sibi uterque conscivit. Quare talis
 death to himself each has been conscious. Wherefore such
each of them put himself to death. Such agreement

improborum consensio non modò excusatione amicitiae
 of wicked agreement not only by excuse of friendship
of wicked men is therefore not only not to be screened by any ex-

tegenda non est, sed potiùs omni supplicio
to be covered not is, but rather all by punishment
cuse of friendship, but rather to be followed with every severity of

vindicanda: ut ne quis sibi concessum putet,
to be vindicated: that not any to himself granted may think,
punishment: that no one may imagine that it is granted to him

amicum, vel bellum patriæ inferentem, sequi:
a friend, or war to country bringing, to follow:
to follow a friend, even when he is bringing war against his country:

quod quidem, ut res cœpit ire, haud scio, an
which indeed, as thing began to go, not I know, whether
which indeed, as affairs now begin to be, may, for aught I know,

aliquando futurum sit. Mihi autem non minori
sometimes about to be may be. To me but not less
be the case at some future period. But I am not less concerned

curæ est, qualis respublica post mortem meam
for care is, such as the republic after death my
as to what the state may be after my death, than what it is at

futura sit, quàm qualis hodie sit.
about to be may be, than such as to day may be.
the present time.

13. Hæc igitur prima lex amicitiae sancitur,
This therefore first law of friendship may be sanctioned,
This therefore may be laid down as the first law of

ut ab amicis honesta petamus, amicorum causâ
that from friends honorable we may seek, of friends for the cause
friendship, that we only ask of our friends what is honorable, that

honestâ faciamus, ne expectemus quidem, dum
honorable we may make, not we may expect indeed, while
we do only that which is honorable for their sake, and that without

rogemur; studium semper adsit, cunctatio
we may be asked; study always may be at, delay
waiting till we are asked; let there be always zeal for their cause, and

absit; consilium verò dare gaudeamus
may be from; counsel indeed to give we may rejoice
let there be no delay; let us indeed be happy to give them good

liberè; plurimùm in amicitia amicorum benè
freely; most in friendship of friends well
counsel; in friendship the rightly-directed power of persuasion

suadentium valeat auctoritas; eaque et
 persuading may be strong authority; that and and
has great weight; and it may be

adhibeatur ad monendum non modò apertè, sed
 may be admitted to advise not only openly, but
used in giving admonition not only openly, but even with severity,

etiam acritèr, si res postulabit; et adhibitæ
 also sharply, if thing shall require; and admitted
if the affair demands it; and when used, let

pareatur. Nam quibusdam, quos audio sapientes
 may be obeyed. For some, whom I hear wise
it be obeyed. For some persons, who I understand are considered

habitos in Græciâ, placuisse opinor mirabilia
 had in Greece, to have pleased I think wonderful
as wise men in Greece, have been pleased, I think, to express certain

quædam: sed nihil est, quod illi non
 some: but nothing is, which they not
strange opinions: but there is no subject which they do not follow

persequantur argutiùs: partim fugiendas esse
 may pursue more ingeniously: partly to be avoided to be
up with peculiar subtlety: that very strong attachments

nimias amicitias, ne necesse sit unum sollicitum
 too much friendships, not necessary may be one anxious
are to be avoided, partly because it is not necessary that one person

esse pro pluribus; satis superque esse suarum
 to be for more; enough above and to be own
should be anxious for many; that every one has more than enough

cuique rerum; alienis nimis implicari
 to every one of things; others too much to be involved
to attend to his own affairs; that it is troublesome to be involved in

molestum esse; commodissimum esse, quàm laxissimas
 troublesome to be; most advantageous to be, than most loose
the affairs of others; that it is most advantageous to hold the reins of

habenas habere amicitiae, quas vel adducas,
 reins to have of friendship, which or thou mayst lead to,
friendship as loosely as possible, that you may draw them up or

cùm velis, vel remittas; caput
 when thou mayst be willing, or thou mayst send back; head
throw them off when you please; that

enim esse ad beatè vivendum, securitatem, quâ
 for to be to happily to be lived, security, which
the sum of living happily is to live securely, which the mind

frui non possit animus, si tamquam parturiat
 to enjoy not may be able mind, if as if may bring forth
cannot do, if one labours, as it were, for

unus pro pluribus. Alios autem dicere, aiunt,
 one for more. Others but to say, they say,
many. It is said that there are others who

multò etiam inhumanius, (quem locum breviter
 by much also more inhumanly, (which place shortly
express themselves more unfeelingly still, (which subject I have

perstrinxi paulò antè) præsidiî adjumentique
 I have touched upon a little before) of defence of assistance and
briefly touched upon already,) that friendships are to be sought for

causâ, non benevolentia, neque caritatis,
 for the cause, not of benevolence, nor of charity,
the sake of protection and assistance, not for benevolence or

amicitias esse expetendas: itaque ut quisque
 friendships to be to be sought from: therefore as every one
kindness: therefore in proportion as

minimum firmitatis habeat, minimumque virium,
 least of firmness may have, least and of strengths,
any one has least firmness and least strength, so he should most

ita amicitias appetere maximè; ex eo fieri
 so friendships to seek to most greatly; from that to be made
earnestly seek after friendships; whence it results that

ut mulierculæ magis amicitiarum præsidia quærunt,
 that little women more of friendships defences seek,
women are more desirous of the protection of friendship than

quàm viri; et inopes, quàm opulenti; calamitosi,
 than men; and needy, than opulent; calamitous,
men; and the poor, than the rich; those who are

quàm ii, qui putentur beati. O præclaram
 than those, who may be thought blessed. O very clear
in adversity, than those who are considered prosperous. Most admirable

sapientiam! solem enim è mundo tollere videntur,
 wisdom! sun for from the world to take they are seen,
philosophy! they indeed seem to take the sun from the world,

qui amicitiam è vitâ tollunt; quâ à Diis
 who friendship from life take; which from Gods
who take away friendship from life, than which we

immortalibus nihil melius habemus, nihil
 immortal nothing better we have, nothing
have nothing from the immortal Gods more excellent, nothing more

jucundius: quæ est enim ista securitas? specie
 more pleasant: what is for that security? in appearance
agreeable: for what is that security? pleasant

quidem blanda, sed reapsâ multis locis repudianda.
 indeed mild, but thing self many in places to be rejected.
indeed in appearance, but in fact for many reasons to be rejected.

Neque enim est consentaneum, ullam honestam rem
 Nor for is agreeing, any honorable thing
For it is not consistent, in order to avoid anxiety, either never to

actionemve, ne sollicitus sis, aut non suscipere,
 action or, not anxious thou mayst be, or not to undertake,
undertake an honorable action, or having undertaken, to relin-

aut susceptam deponere: quòd si curam fugimus,
 or undertaken to lay aside: because if care we flee,
quish it: but if we avoid care, we must

virtus fugienda est; quæ necesse est, cum aliquâ
 virtue to be fled is; which necessary is, with some
avoid virtue also; which of necessity despises and

curâ res sibi contrarias aspernetur atque
 care things to itself contrary may despise and
hates with some degree of care things contrary to

oderit; ut bonitas malitiam, temperantia
 may have hated; as goodness wickedness, temperance
itself: as goodness hates wickedness, temperance lust,

libidinem, ignaviam fortitudo. Itaque videas
 lust, cowardice fortitude. Therefore thou mayst see
and fortitude cowardice. And thus you see that

rebus injustis justos maximè dolere, inbecillibus
 in things unjust just chiefly to grieve, weak
the just are much grieved at injustice, the brave at weakness, and

fortes, flagitiosis modestos. Ergò hoc proprium est
 strong, flagitious modest. Therefore this peculiar is
the modest at impurity. This therefore is peculiar to a

animi benè constituti, et lætari bonis rebus,
 of mind well constituted, and to be glad good in things,
well constituted mind; both to rejoice at what is good, and to grieve

et dolere contrariis. Quamobrem si cadit in
 and to grieve contrary. Wherefore if falls in
at what is bad. If therefore grief of mind falls

sapientem animi dolor; (qui profectò cadit, nisi
 wise of mind grief; (which indeed falls, unless
upon a wise man; (which indeed must be the case,

ex ejus animo extirpatam humanitatem
 from of him mind extirpated humanity
unless we imagine the feelings of humanity to be banished from

arbitremur) quæ causa est, cur amicitiam funditus
 we may judge) which cause is, why friendship altogether
the mind) what reason is there, that we should altogether take

tollamus è vitâ, ne aliquas propter eam
 we make take from life, not any on account of it
friendship away from life, lest we may undergo some degree of

suscipiamus molestias; quid enim interest, motu
 we may undertake troubles; what for it concerns, motion
trouble on account of it; for what difference is there, when

animi sublato, non dico inter hominem et pecudem,
 of mind taken away, not I say between man and cattle,
the emotions of the mind are removed, I do not say between man

sed inter hominem et saxum, aut truncum, aut
 but between man and a stone, or a trunk, or
and cattle, but between man and a stone or trunk, or anything of

quidvis generis ejusdem? neque enim sunt isti
 whatever of kind the same? nor for are those
that kind? for they are not to be listened to,

audiendi, qui virtutem duram, et quasi ferream
 to be heard, who virtue hard, and as if made of iron
who represent virtue to be something harsh, and as it were made

esse volunt; quæ quidem est, cùm multis in rebus,
 to be are willing; which indeed is, when many in things,
of iron: but in truth it is, as in many other things, so also

tum in amicitia, tenera atque tractabilis; ut et
 then in friendship, tender and tractable; that and
in friendship, gentle and tractable; so that

bonis amici quasi diffundantur, et incommodis
with good friends as if may be diffused, and disadvantages
friends are delighted as it were with what is good, and are grieved

contrahantur.

may be drawn together.

at what is evil.

14. Quamobrem angor iste, qui pro amico sæpè

Wherefore vexation that, which for a friend often

Wherefore that anxiety of mind, which is often endured

capiendus est, non tantum valet, ut tollat è
to be taken is, not so much is strong, that it may take from
for a friend, is not of such power as to take away friendship

vitâ amicitiam; non plus, quàm ut virtutes, quia
life friendship; not more, than that virtues, because
from life, any more than virtues are rejected, because

nonnullas curas et molestias afferunt, repudientur.

some cares and troubles they bring to, may be rejected.
they bring with them many cares and troubles.

Cùm autem contrahat amicitiam, (ut suprà

When but may draw together friendship, (as above

But when the mind contracts a friendship, (as I have said above,)

dixi) si qua significatio virtutis eluceat,

I said) if any signification of virtue may shine out,
if any symptom of virtue manifests itself, to which a similar dis-

ad quam se similis animus applicet et adjungat;
to which itself like mind may apply and may join to;
position may apply and unite itself,

id cùm contingit, amor exoriatur necesse est: quid

that when it happens, love may arise from necessary is: what
when that happens, love naturally arises: for

enim tam absurdum, quàm delectari multis

for so absurd, as to be delighted with many
what is so absurd, as to be delighted with many empty things,

inanibus rebus, ut honore, ut gloriâ, ut ædificio,

empty by things, as by honor, as by glory, as by building,
such as honor, and glory, as building, clothing, and decoration of

ut vestitu, cultuque corporis; animo autem

as by clothing, by dress and of body; by mind but
the body; but not to be very

virtute prædito, eo, qui vel amare, vel (ut ita
with virtue endowed, it, who or to love, or (as so
greatly delighted with a mind endowed with virtue, which is able

dicam) redamare possit, non admodum
I may say) to love again may be able, not very much
to love or (if I may so speak) to return love for

delectari? nihil est enim remuneratione
to be delighted? nothing is for remuneration
love? for nothing is more pleasant than the reci-

benevolentiae, nihil vicissitudine studiorum
of benevolence, nothing vicissitude of studies
procation of benevolence, nothing more agreeable than the interchange

officiorumque jucundius. Quòd si etiam illud
of duties and more pleasant. That if also that
of kind and good offices. But if we also add that,

addimus, quod rectè addi potest, nihil esse,
we add, which rightly to be added is able, nothing to be,
which with justice may be added, that there is nothing which so

quod ad se rem ullam tam alliciat, et tam
which to itself thing any so may allure, and so
allures and attracts anything to itself, as similarity of disposition

attrahat, quàm ad amicitiam similitudo; concedetur
may draw to, as to friendship likeness; it will be granted
allures to friendship; it will be granted

profectò verum esse, ut bonos boni diligant,
indeed true to be, that good good may love,
to be true indeed, that the good love the good, and that they

adsciscantque sibi, quasi propinquitate conjunctos
may join and to themselves, as if by nearness conjoined
unite them to themselves, as if connected by relationship and

atque naturâ. Nihil est enim appetentius
and by nature. Nothing is for more desirous
nature. For nothing is more desirous of things

similium sui, nihil rapacius, quàm natura.
of like of itself, nothing more rapacious, than nature.
like itself, nothing more attractive than nature.

Quamobrem hoc quidem, Fanni et Scævola,
Wherefore this indeed, O Fannius and O Scævola,
Wherefore, Fannius and Scævola, this indeed is manifest, (as I

constat (ut opinor) bonis inter bonos quasi
it stands with (as I think) to the good between good as if
think,) that a feeling of benevolence towards the good is, as it

necessariam benevolentiam esse; qui est amicitiae
necessary benevolence to be; which is of friendship
were, necessary to the good; this feeling is by nature

fons à naturâ constitutus; sed eadem bonitas
fountain by nature appointed; but the same goodness
ordained to be the spring of friendship; but the same kind of

etiam ad multitudinem pertinet; non est enim
also to multitude belongs; not is for
goodness is common to many; for virtue is not

inhumana virtus, neque immanis, neque superba;
inhuman virtue, nor cruel, nor proud;
inhuman, nor cruel, nor proud;

quæ etiam populos universos tueri, eisque
which also people all to regard, for them and
which is also accustomed to preserve all people, and to consult

optimè consulere soleat; quod non faceret
best to consult may be accustomed; which not might make
most beneficially for them; which indeed it would

profectò, si à caritate vulgi abhorreret.
indeed, if from charity of the common people might abhor.
not do, if it revolted from all regard of the common people.

Atque etiam mihi quidem videntur, qui utilitatis
And also to me indeed they are seen, who of usefulness
And they, who form friendships for the sake of utility, appear to

causâ fingunt amicitias, amabilissimum nodum
for the cause form friendships, most amiable knot
me to take away the most lovely bond of

amicitiæ tollere: non enim tam utilitas parta
of friendship to take: not for so usefulness obtained
friendship: for utility is not so much obtained by

per amicum, quàm amici amor ipse delectat;
through a friend, as of a friend love self delights;
means of a friend, as the very love of a friend himself delights us;

tumque illud fit, quod ab amico est profectum,
then and that is made, which from a friend is advanced,
and then it comes to pass, that whatever proceeds from a friend

jucundum, si cum studio est profectum; tantumque
 pleasant, if with study is advanced; so much and
is pleasant, provided it be done with zeal: and so far

abest, ut amicitiae propter indigentiam
 is from, that friendships on account of indigence
is it from being the case, that friendships are cultivated through

colantur, ut ii, qui opibus, et copiis
 may be cultivated, that they, who with riches, and with abundance
necessity, that those persons, who being endowed with wealth and

maximèque virtute præditi, (in quâ plurimum
 most greatly and with virtue endowed, (in which most
abundance, and especially with virtue (in which there is the greatest

est præsidii) minimè alterius indigeant, liberalissimi
 is of defence) least of another may want, most liberal
resource), stand least in need of another's help, are the most liberal

sint, et beneficentissimi. Atque haud scio,
 may be, and most beneficent. And not I know,
and the most beneficent. And I do not know, whether

an ne opus sit quidem, nihil umquam
 whether not need may be indeed, nothing ever
it be necessary, that our friends should never stand in need of

omninò deesse amicis. Ubi enim studia nostra
 altogether to be from to friends. When for studies our
anything, For how would our friendship

viguissent, si numquam consilio, numquam
 might have flourished, if never counsel, never
have flourished, if Scipio had never needed my

operâ nostrâ nec domi, nec militiæ Scipio
 assistance our nor at home, nor in war Scipio
counsel or assistance either in peace or in

eguisset? non igitur utilitatem amicitia,
 might have wanted? not therefore usefulness friendship,
war? friendship therefore did not follow utility,

sed utilitas amicitiam consecuta est.
 but usefulness friendship having followed together is.
but utility followed friendship.

15. Non ergo erunt homines deliciis diffuentes
 Not therefore will be men with delights overflowing
Men therefore given up to luxury are not to be regarded,

audiendi, si quando de amicitia, quam nec
 to be heard, if at any time from friendship, which nor
if at any time they shall discourse concerning friendship, of which
 usu, nec ratione habent cognitam, disputabunt.
 by use, nor by reason have known, will dispute.
they have no knowledge either from experience or reasoning.

Nam quis est, pro Deum fidem, atque hominum!
 For who is, Oh of Gods faith, and of men!
For who is there, in the name of Gods and men!

qui velit, ut neque diligat quemquam, nec
 who may be willing, that nor may love any one, nor
who could be willing, on condition that he should not love any one

ipse ab ullo diligatur, circumfluere omnibus
 self by any may be loved, to flow around all
nor be himself beloved by any one, to abound in all manner

copiis, atque in omnium rerum abundantia
 with abundance, at in all of things abundance
of wealth, and to live in an abundance of all earthly

vivere? hæc enim est tyrannorum vita; in qua
 to live? this for is of tyrants life; in which
good? for this is the life of tyrants; in which

nimirum nulla fides, nulla caritas, nulla stabilis
 no wonder no faith, no charity, no stable
it is no wonder that there can be no faith, no kindness, no firm

benevolentiae potest esse fiducia; omnia semper
 of benevolence is able to be confidence; all always
confidence of benevolence; every thing is the

suspecta, atque sollicita; nullus locus amicitiae.
 suspected, and anxious; none place for friendship.
source of suspicion and anxiety; there is no room for friendship.

Quis enim aut eum diligat, quem metuit; aut
 Who for or him may love, whom he fears; or
For who can love a person whom he fears, or

eum à quo se metui putat? Coluntur
 him by whom himself to be feared thinks? They are cultivated
one by whom he supposes that he himself is feared? Such persons

tamen simulatione duntaxat ad tempus: quod si
 yet by pretence only to time: that if
are revered merely by pretence for a time: but if by

fortè (ut fit plerumque) ceciderint, tum
perhaps (as is made generally) they may have fallen, then
chance (as it frequently happens) they fall into adversity, then it

intelligitur, quàm fuerint inopes amicorum;
is understood, how they may have been destitute of friends;
is perceived how destitute they have been of friends;

quod Tarquinius dixisse ferunt, exulantem
which Tarquinius to have said they bring, being in exile
which Tarquin is reported to have said, that being in banishment

se intellexisse, quos fidos amicos habuisset,
himself to have understood, whom faithful friends might have had,
he knew what faithful friends he possessed, and what unfaithful

quos infidos, cùm jam neutris gratiam referre
whom unfaithful, when now neither favour to bring back
ones, since now he was not able to return the kindness of

posset. Quamquam miror, illâ superbiâ et
he might be able. Although I wonder, that with pride and
either. Though I am astonished, that, with such pride

importunitate, si quemquam habere potuit. Atque
with moroseness, if any one to have he has been able. And
and ill-humour, he should ever have possessed a friend at all. And as

ut hujus, quem dixi, mores veros amicos parare
as of him, whom I said, manners true friends to procure
the manners of him, whom I have named, were not able to procure

non potuere; sic multorum opes præpotentium
not have been able; so of many riches very powerful
true friends; so the great wealth of many very powerful

excludunt amicitias fideles. Non enim solùm ipsa
shut out friendships faithful. Not for only self
persons exclude faithful friendships. For not only is fortune

fortuna cæca est; sed eos etiam plerumque efficit
fortune blind is; but those also generally it makes
itself blind; but frequently also makes blind those on

cæcos, quos complexa est. Itaque efferuntur
blind, whom having embraced it is. Therefore are brought out
whom it confers its favours. Therefore they are elated

illi ferè fastidio, et contumaciâ; neque quidquam
they almost by pride, and by insolence; nor anything
with pride and insolence; nor can any thing be

insipiente fortunato intolerabilius fieri potest.
 foolish fortunate more intolerable to be made is able.
more intolerable than a foolish man in great prosperity.

Atque hoc quidem videre licet, eos qui antea
 And this indeed to see it is lawful, those who before
And this indeed we may observe, that those, who have hitherto

commodis fuerunt moribus; imperio, potestate,
 convenient have been of manners; by command, by power,
been of agreeable manners, become changed by au-

prosperis rebus inmutari, spernique ab iis
 prosperous by things to be changed, to be despised and by those
thority, power, or prosperous circumstances; and that old friend-

veteres amicitias, indulgeri novis. Quid
 old friendships, to be indulged by new. What
ships are despised by them, and they cultivate new ones. But

autem stultius, quàm, cùm plurimùm copiis,
 but more foolish, than, when most by abundance,
what is more foolish, than, when they most abound in plenty, in

facultatibus, opibus possint, cetera parare, quæ
 by means, by riches may be able, other to procure, which
power, in riches, to procure other things, which are to be procured

parantur ab pecuniâ, equos, famulos, vestem
 are procured by money, horses, servants, a garment
by money, such as horses, servants, splendid clothing, precious

egregiam, vasa pretiosa: amicos non parare, optimam
 excellent, vessels precious: friends not to procure, best
vessels: but not to procure friends, the best

et pulcherrimam vitæ, ut ita dicam, suppellectilem?
 and most beautiful of life, as so I may say, furniture?
and the most beautiful furniture of life, if I may so speak?

etenim cetera cùm parant, cui parent,
 for other when they procure, for whom they may procure,
for when they procure other things, they know not for whom they

nesciunt, nec cujus causâ laborent:
 they know not, nor of whom for the cause they may labour:
procure them, nor for whose sake they labour:

ejus enim est istorum quodque, qui vincit viribus;
 of him for is of those every, who conquers by strengths;
for each one of these is his, who conquers by his strength:

amicitiarum sua cuique permanet stabilis, et
 of friendships own to every one remains stable, and
but the possession of his friendships remains firm and sure to

certa possessio; ut, etiam si illa maneat, quæ
 certain possession; that, also if those may remain, which
even if those things remain, which are,

sunt quasi dona fortunæ, tamen vita inculta, et
 are as if gifts of fortune, yet life uncultivated, and
as it were, the gifts of fortune; yet if life is solitary and unblest

deserta ab amicis, non possit esse jucunda. Sed
 deserted by friends, not may be able to be pleasant. But
by friendship, it cannot be truly enjoyed. So

hæc hactenus.

these so far.
much on this topic.

16. Constituendi autem sunt, qui sint in amicitia
 To be appointed but are, what may be in friendship
But some regulations are to be adopted in friendship, and

fines, et quasi termini diligendi, de quibus tres
 ends, and as if limits of loving, from which three
some limits, as it were, to be put to our regards, concerning which

video sententias ferri, quarum nullam probo;
 I see opinions to be brought, of which none I approve;
I have seen three opinions stated, not one of which I approve;

unam, ut eodem modo erga amicum affecti
 one, that same in manner towards a friend affected
one is, that we ought to be affected towards a friend exactly as we

simus, quo erga nosmetipsos; alteram, ut nostra
 we may be, which towards ourselves; another, that our
are towards ourselves; another is, that our

in amicos benevolentia, illorum erga nos benevolentia
 in friends benevolence, of them towards us to benevolence
benevolence towards our friends should precisely and perfectly cor-

pariter æqualiterque respondeat; tertiam, ut
 in like manner equally and may answer; third, that
respond with theirs towards ourselves; the third is, that

quanti quisque se ipse facit, tanti
 of how much every one himself self makes, of so much
as much as every one makes of himself, so much should he be made

fiat ab amicis. Harum trium sententiarum
 may be made by friends. These three of opinions
of by his friends. I do not altogether assent to any

nulli prorsus assentior; nec enim illa prima vera
 to none altogether I assent; nor for that first true
one of these three opinions; for that first-named opinion is

est, ut, quemadmodum in se quisque, sic in
 is, that, after the same manner in himself every one, so in
not true, that one should so feel towards a friend as towards

amicum sit animatus. Quàm multa enim, quæ
 a friend may be dispositioned. How many for, which
one's self. For how many things do we for

nostrâ causâ numquam faceremus, facimus
 our for the cause never we might make, we make
the sake of our friends, which we would not do on our own ac-

causâ amicorum? precari ab indigno,
 for the cause of friends? to pray from unworthy,
count? to ask favours from and to solicit

supplicare; tum acerbîus in aliquem invehi,
 to supplicate; then more bitterly in any one to be carried on,
the unworthy; then to inveigh very bitterly against any one, and to

insectarique vehementius: quæ in nostris rebus non
 to pursue and more vehemently: which in our things not
bear a strong feeling of resentment: things which in our own affairs

satis honestè, in amicorum fiunt honestissimè:
 enough honorably, in of friends are made most honorably:
are not becoming, are very honorably done in behalf of our friends:

multæque res sunt, in quibus de suis commodis
 many and things are, in which from own advantages
and there are many things, in which good men sacrifice their own

virî boni multa detrahunt, detrahique patiuntur,
 men good many draw from, to be drawn from and suffer,
advantage or suffer loss, in order that their friends may enjoy,

ut iis amici potiùs, quàm ipsi fruantur. Altera
 that them friends rather, than selves may enjoy. Another
rather than themselves. Another

sententia est, quæ definit amicitiam paribus officiis,
 opinion is, which defines friendship equal by duties,
opinion is that which limits friendship by equal duties and incli-

ac voluntatibus: hoc quidem est nimis exiguè et
 and by wills: this indeed is too much minutely and
 nations: this indeed is to reduce friendship too closely

exiliter ad calculos vocare amicitiam, ut par
 slenderly to pebbles to call friendship, that equal
 and minutely to a matter of calculation, that there may be a regular

sit ratio acceptorum et datorum. Ditiore mihi
 may be reason of received and of given. More rich to me
 balance of kindness given and received. True friendship

et affluentior videtur esse vera amicitia; nec observare
 and more affluent is seen to be true friendship; nor to observe
 appears to me to be more wealthy and liberal; and not to watch

restrictè, ne plus reddat, quàm acceperit;
 restrictedly, not more may render, than may have received;
 closely, that it does not give more than it has received;

neque enim verendum est, ne quid excidat, aut
 nor for to be feared is, not what may fall from, or
 nor is it to be feared, lest any thing should be lost, or lest any

ne quid in terram defluat, aut ne plus æquo
 not what in earth may flow down, or not more equal
 thing should fall to the ground, or lest more than what is right

quid in amicitiam congeratur. Tertius verò ille
 what in friendship may be heaped together. Third indeed that
 should be lavished on friendship. But the third and

finis deterrimus, ut, quanti quisque se ipse
 end worst, that, of how much every one himself self
 worst limit of friendship is, that as much as every one makes of himself,

faciat, tanti fiat ab amicis: sæpè enim
 may make, of so much may be made by friends: often for
 so much he should be made of by his friends: for it often

in quibusdam aut animus abjectior est, aut spes
 in some or mind more abject is, or hope
 happens with some persons, either that the mind is more abject or the

amplificandæ fortunæ fractior: non est igitur
 to be amplified of fortune more broken: not is therefore
 hope of improving his condition is more feeble: it is not therefore

amici, talem esse in eum, qualis ille in se est;
 of a friend, such to be in him, such as that in himself is;
 the part of a friend, to be towards him as he is to himself;

sed potius eniti, et efficere, ut amici
 but rather to endeavour, and to effect, that of a friend
but rather to endeavour effectually to rouse the drooping spirit

jacentem animum excitet, inducatque spem,
 lying mind may excite, may lead on and hope,
of his friend, and to give him hopes and better

cogitationemque meliorem. Alius igitur finis
 thought and better. Other therefore end
thoughts. Another limit of true friend-

veræ amicitiae constituendus est, si prius, quid
 true of friendship to be appointed is, if before, what
ship remains to be settled, after I shall have first mentioned

maximè reprehendere Scipio solitus sit,
 most greatly to reprove Scipio accustomed may be,
that which Scipio was accustomed to reprobate most

dixero. Negabat ullam vocem inimiciorem
 I shall have said. He was denying any voice more hostile
strongly. He said that no sentiment could be more

amicitiae potuisse reperiri, quàm ejus, qui
 to friendship to have been able to be found, than of him, who
destructive of friendship than that of him who said, That

dixisset, Ita amare oportere, ut si aliquando
 might have said, So to love to behove, as if sometime
we ought to love so as if we should at some time

esset osurus: nec verò se adduci
 might be about to hate: nor indeed himself to be led to
hate: nor indeed could he bring himself to

posse, ut hoc, quemadmodum putaretur,
 to be able, that this, after the same manner might be thought,
believe, that this sentiment, as it is supposed, was ever

à Biante esse dictum crederet, qui sapiens
 by Bias to be said he might believe, who wise
uttered by Bias, who was said to be one of the seven

habitus esset unus è Septem; sed impuri cujusdam,
 had might be one from seven; but impure of some one,
Wise Men; but thought it to be the

aut ambitiosi, aut omnia ad suam potentiam
 or ambitious, or all to own power
opinion of some impure or ambitious man, or of one desiring to bring

revocantis esse sententiam. Quonam enim modo
 recalling to be opinion. What for in manner
 every thing into his own power. For how is any one able to

quisquam amicus esse poterit, cui se
 any one friend to be shall have been able, to whom himself
 be a friend to any person, to whom he considers that he may

putabit inimicum esse posse? quin etiam necesse
 shall think unfriendly to be to be able? moreover necessary
 become an enemy? besides, it will become

erit cupere et optare, ut quàm sæpissimè
 will be to desire and to wish, that as most often
 necessary to desire and wish that a friend may frequently do

peccet amicus, quòd plures det sibi tamquam
 may sin friend, that more may give to himself as if
 wrong, in order that he may give more occasions for

ansas ad reprehendendum: rursùm autem rectè factis
 handles to reprove: again but rightly made
 reproof: and again, it will be necessary to

commodisque amicorum necesse erit angì,
 convenient and of friends necessary will be to be vexed,
 be vexed at, to grieve for, and to be envious at, whatever is rightly and

dolere, invidere. Quare hoc quidem præceptum,
 to grieve, to envy. Wherefore this indeed precept,
 properly done by our friends. This precept, therefore, whoever is

cujuscumque est, ad tollendam amicitiam valet.
 of whomsoever is, to be lifted up friendship is strong.
 its author, has the effect of destroying friendship.

Illud potiùs præcipiendum fuit, ut eam diligentiam
 That rather to be taught has been, that that diligence
 That precept ought rather to be given, that we should use such

adhiberemus in amicitiiis comparandis, ut nequando
 we might admit in friendships to be procured, that by no means
 care in the formation of friendships, that we should never begin

amare inciperemus eum, quem aliquando odisse
 to love we might begin him, whom sometime to have hated
 to love him, whom we might hereafter have occasion to

possemus: quin etiam si minùs felices in diligendo
 we might be able: moreover if less happy in choosing
 hate: besides, if we have been unfortunate in the

fuissemus, ferendum id Scipio potiùs, quàm
we might have been, to be brought that Scipio rather, than
choice of friends, Scipio thought it would be better to bear with

inimicitiarum tempus cogitandum putabat.
of enmities time to be thought he was thinking.
that, than to contemplate a time of enmity.

17. His igitur finibus utendum arbitror, ut,
These therefore ends to use I think, that,
These limits therefore I think should be observed, that,

cùm emendati mores amicorum sint, tum sit
when corrected manners of friends may be, then may be
when the manners of friends are correct, there may be between

inter eos omnium rerum, consiliorum,
between those all of things, of counsels,
them a community of all things, of designs, and wishes without

voluntatum, sinè ullâ exceptione communitas; ut,
of wishes, without any exception community; that,
any exception; that

etiam si quâ fortunâ acciderit, ut minùs
also if any by fortune may have happened, that less
also if by any chance it should happen, that some less strictly just

justæ amicorum voluntates adjuvandæ sint, in quibus
just of friends wishes to be assisted may be, in which
desires of our friends should be forwarded, in certain cases in which

eorum aut caput agatur, aut fama, declinandum
of them or head may be done, or fame, to be declined
their life or reputation may be concerned, some little deviation may

sit de viâ, modò ne summa turpitudine sequatur:
may be from the way, only not chief baseness may follow:
be allowed, provided that it leads not to any thing that is disgraceful;

est enim quatenus amicitiae dari venia possit:
is for as far as of friendship to be given pardon may be able:
for thus far allowance may be made for friendship;

nec verò negligenda est fama; nec mediocre telum
nor indeed to be neglected is fame; nor moderate weapon
nor indeed is reputation to be despised; nor ought we to consider

ad res gerendas existimare oportet benevolentiam
to things to be carried to think it behoves benevolence
the good-will of our fellow-citizens a small assistance in public

civium, quam blanditiis, et assentando colligere
 of citizens, which by soothings, and by flattering to collect
business; it is however disreputable to conciliate this good-will by mean

turpe est: virtus, quam sequitur caritas,
 base is: virtue, which follows charity,
compliances and flattery: the virtue, which is followed by good-will,

minimè repudianda est. Sed sæpè (etenim redeo
 least to be rejected is. But often (for I return
is by no means to be rejected. But often (for I return to

ad Scipionem, cujus omnis sermo erat de amicitia)
 to Scipio, of whom all discourse was from friendship)
Scipio, all whose conversation was concerning friendship)

querebatur, quòd omnibus rebus homines
 he was complaining, that all in things men
he complained, that in all things men were more atten-

diligentiores essent; ut capras, et oves quot
 more diligent might be; that she-goats, and sheep how many
tive; that every one was able to say how

quisque haberet, dicere posset; amicos quot
 every one might have, to say he might be able; friends how many
many goats or how many sheep he had, but could not say how

haberet, non posset dicere; et in illis quidem
 he might have, not he might be able to say; and in them indeed
many friends he possessed; and in procuring those

parandis adhibere curam, in amicis eligendis
 to be procured to admit care, in friends to be chosen from
indeed they used great care, but they were negligent in choosing

negligentes esse; nec habere quasi signa quædam,
 negligent to be; nor to have as if signs some,
friends; nor had they, as it were, any certain

et notas, quibus eos, qui ad amicitiam essent
 and marks, by which those, who to friendship might be
signs or marks by which they might judge who were fit for

idonei, judicarent. Sunt igitur firmi, et
 fit, they might judge. Are therefore firm, and
friendship. Those therefore are to be chosen

stabiles, et constantes eligendi; cujus generis est
 stable, and constant to be chosen from; which of kind is
who are firm, stable, and constant; of which kind there

magna penuria: et judicare difficile est sanè,
 great want: and to judge difficult is indeed,
is great want: and it is difficult indeed to judge without

nisi expertum; experiendum autem est in ipsâ
 unless tried; to be tried but is in self
trial; but the trial must be made in friendship

amicitiâ; ita præcurrit amicitia judicium, tollitque
 friendship; so runs before friendship judgment, takes away and
itself: thus friendship runs before judgment, and takes away

experiendi potestatem. Est igitur prudentis, sustinere,
 of trying power. Is therefore of prudent, to sustain,
the power of trying. It is therefore the part of a prudent man

ut currum, sic impetum benevolentiae;
 as a chariot, so the attack of benevolence;
to regulate the impulses of friendship as he would guide a chariot;

quo utamur, quasi equis tentatis,
 which we may use, as if with horses tried,
which we use, as it were, with tried horses, so we may

sic amicitias, aliquâ parte periclitatis moribus
 so friendships, some part being tried manners
use friendship, having in some measure tried the manners of

amicorum. Quidam sæpè in parvâ pecuniâ
 of friends. Some often in small money
our friends. Some persons are often seen through in a small

perspiciuntur, quàm sint leves; quidam, quos
 are seen through, how they may be light; some, whom
pecuniary matter, how light they are; some, whom a

parva movere non potuit, cognoscuntur in magnâ:
 small to move not has been able, are known in great:
small sum has not been able to move, are discovered in a great one:

sin verò erunt aliqui reperti, qui pecuniam
 but if indeed shall be some found, who money
but if indeed some shall be found, who think it base to prefer

præferre amicitiae, sordidum existiment; ubi eos
 to bring before to friendship, sordid may think; where those
money to friendship; where shall

inveniemus, qui honores, magistratus, imperia,
 we shall find, who honors, magistracies, commands,
we find those who do not prefer honors, magistracies, command,

potestates, opes, amicitiae non anteponant? ut,
powers, riches, to friendship not may place before? that,
power, and riches, to friendship? that,

cùm ex alterâ parte proposita hæc sint, ex
when from another part placed before these may be, from
when on the one hand these are proposed, and on the other the

alterâ jus amicitiae non multò illa malint?
another law of friendship not by much those may be more willing?
law of friendship, they will not greatly prefer the former?

imbecilla enim natura est ad contemnendam potentiam;
weak for nature is to to be despised power;
for nature is feeble to resist power;

quam etiam si neglectâ amicitia consecuti sunt,
which also if neglected friendship having followed are,
which if men attain even by neglecting the laws of friendship, they

obscuratum iri arbitrantur, quia non sinè magnâ
obscured to be gone they think, because not without great
think they shall be unproved, because they have not sacrificed

causâ sit neglecta amicitia. Itaque veræ amicitiae
cause may be neglected friendship. Therefore true friendships
friendship without great inducement. Therefore true friendships

difficillimè reperiuntur in iis, qui in honoribus,
most difficultly are found in those, who in honors,
are with the utmost difficulty found among those, who are occupied

reque publicâ versantur. Ubi enim istum
thing and public are turned. Where for that
in honors and in public business. For where can you find

invenias, qui honorem amici anteponant suo?
thou mayst find, who honor of a friend may place before own?
that man, who prefers the honor of a friend to his own?

Quid? hæc ut omittam, quàm graves, quàm
What? these that I may omit, how heavy, how
Why? to pass by other considerations, how painful, how dif-

difficiles plerisque videntur calamitatum societates?
difficult to most are seen of calamities societies?
ficult to most persons appears the partnership of calamities?

ad quas non est facile inventu, qui descendat.
to which not is easy in finding, who may descend.
it is difficult to find any who will engage in it.

Quamquam Ennius rectè,
 Although Ennius rightly,
 Although Ennius rightly says,

Amicus certus in re incertâ cernitur :

A friend certain in thing uncertain is discerned :

A sure friend is discerned in uncertain events :

tamen hæc duo levitatis, et infirmitatis plerosque
 yet these two of levity, and of infirmity most
 yet these two things convict most persons of levity or of
 convincunt; aut si in bonis rebus contemnunt, aut
 convict; or if in good things they despise, or
 weakness; either if in prosperity they despise, or in adversity
 in malis deserunt.
 in bad they desert.
 they desert.

18. Qui igitur utrâque in re gravem, constantem,

Who therefore each in thing heavy, constant,

Him therefore, who in each condition shows himself

stabilem se in amicitia præstiterit, hunc ex
 stable himself in friendship may have shown, this from
 firm, constant, and steady in friendship, we ought to regard

maximè raro hominum genere judicare debemus,
 most greatly rare of men kind to judge we owe,
 as being of a very peculiar race of men, and almost

et poenè divino. Firmamentum autem stabilitatis,
 and almost divine. Support but of stability.
 divine. But the support of that stability

constantiaque ejus, quam in amicitia quærimus,
 of constancy and that, which in friendship we seek,
 and constancy which we seek in friendship is

fides est. Nihil enim stabile est, quod infidum est.
 faith is. Nothing for stable is, which unfaithful is.
 fidelity. For nothing is stable which is unfaithful.

Simplicem prætereâ, et communem, et censentientem,

Simple moreover, and common, and agreeing,
 It is moreover proper to make choice of one who is artless, open,

qui rebus iisdem moveatur, eligi par est;
 who things same may be moved, to be chosen from equal is;
 and ingenuous, and who may be affected by the same interests;

quæ omnia pertinent ad fidelitatem: neque enim
 which all belong to fidelity: nor for
all which things belong to fidelity: for artifice and

fidum potest esse multiplex ingenium, et tortuosum.
 faithful is able to be manifold disposition, and winding.
duplicity can never be susceptible of fidelity.

Neque verò, qui non iisdem rebus movetur, et
 Nor indeed, who not same by things is moved, and
Nor indeed can he be either faithful or steady, who is not moved by

naturâ consentit, aut fidus, aut stabilis potest esse.
 in nature agrees, or faithful, or stable is able to be.
similarity of interests, and who is not of a corresponding disposition.

Addendum eodem est, ut ne criminibus, aut
 To be added in the same is, that not with crimes, or
To this it must be added, that he is not delighted with bringing

inferendis delectetur, aut credat
 to be brought in may be delighted, or may believe
accusations against a friend, nor ready to believe such as are brought

oblatis; quæ omnia pertinent ad eam, quam
 offered; which all belong to that, which
against him; all which things belong to that constancy of which

jamdudum tracto, constantiam. Ita fit verum
 already I handle, constancy. So is made true
I have already treated. Thus is established

illud, quod initio dixi, amicitiam, nisi inter
 that, which in the beginning I said, friendship, unless between
the truth of what I said at the beginning, that friendship cannot

bonos, esse non posse; est enim boni viri (quem
 good, to be not to be able; is for good of man (whom
subsist but among the good; for it is the first part of a good

eundem sapientem licet dicere) hæc duo tenere
 the same wise it is lawful to say) these two to hold
man (whom we may also call a wise man) to observe these two

in amicitia; primum ne quid sit fictum, neve
 in friendship; first not what may be feigned, nor
things in friendship; first, not to use any deceit or insin-

simulatum; (apertè enim vel odisse, magis
 pretended; {openly for or to have hated, more
cerity; (for to hate openly, is more worthy of an inge-

ingenui est, quàm fronte occultare sententiam)
 ingenuous is, than by forehead to hide opinion)
ingenuous mind, than to conceal an ill opinion under a fair appearance)

deinde, non solùm ab aliquo allatas criminationes
 thence, not only by some brought to accusations
then, not only to repel accusations brought by others, but not

repellere, sed ne ipsum quidem esse suspiciosum,
 to repel, but not self indeed to be suspicious,
even to be suspicious himself, nor to be always imagining that

semper aliquid existimantem ab amico esse violatum.
 always something thinking by a friend to be violated.
something wrong has been done by his friend.

Accedat huc suavitas quædam oportet sermonum
 May approach here sweetness some it behoves of discourses
To this there should be added a certain suavity of language and

atque morum, haudquaquam mediocre condimentum
 and of manners, by no means moderate seasoning
manners, which is no slight ingredient in the formation of friend-

amicitiæ. Tristitia autem, et in omni re severitas,
 of friendship. Sorrow but, and in every thing severity,
ship. Harshness and severity of manner in every thing

habet illa quidem gravitatem; sed amicitia remissior
 has that indeed gravity; but friendship more remiss
has a certain degree of gravity; but friendship ought to be

esse debet, et liberior, et dulcior, et ad omnem
 to be owes, and more free, and sweeter, and to all
more easy and more free, more gentle and more inclined to affability

comitatem, facilitatemque proclivior.
 affability, easiness and more inclined.
and courtesy.

19. Existit autem hoc loco quædam quæstio
 Exists but this in place some question
But there exists in this place a question of some little

subdifficilis; num quando amici novi, digni
 rather difficult; whether when friends new, worthy
difficulty; whether new friends, who are worthy of friend-

amicitiâ, veteribus sint antepoenendi, ut equis
 of friendship, old may be to be placed before, as to horses
ship, should be preferred to old friends, as we are accustomed to

vetulis teneros anteponere solemus? — indigna
old tender to put before we are accustomed? — unworthy
prefer young horses to old ones? — a doubt

homine dubitatio; non enim amicitiarum esse debent,
of man doubt; not for of friendships to be they owe,
unworthy of a man; for there ought not to be a satiety of

sicut aliarum rerum, satietates: veterrima quæque
as if other of things, satieties: oldest every
friendships as of other things: the oldest (as those

(ut ea vina, quæ vetustatem ferunt) esse debent
(as those wines, which age bring) to be they owe
wines which are of the greatest age) ought to be the

suavissima; verumque illud est, quod dicitur, *multos*
the sweetest; true and that is, which is said, many
sweetest; and that observation is true which says, That we

modios salis simul edendos esse, ut amicitiae
measures of salt together to be eaten to be, that of friendship
must eat many measures of salt together, that the duty of friend-

munus expletum sit. Novitates autem, si spem
gift filled may be. Novelties but, if hope
ship may be fulfilled. But those new friendships, if

afferunt, ut tamquam in herbis non fallacibus, fructus
they bring to, that as if in herbs not deceitful, fruit
they bring hope, that, as in the promising vegetation, fruit may

appareat, non sunt illæ quidem repudiandæ; vetustas
may appear, not are those indeed to be rejected; age
hereafter appear, are not indeed to be despised; but an old

tamen suo loco conservanda est: maxima est enim
yet own in place to be kept together is: greatest is for
friendship ought to be kept in its own place: for the force of age

vis vetustatis, et consuetudinis: atqui in ipso
force of age, and of custom: but in self
and of habit is very great: but with regard to

equo, cujus modò mentionem feci, si nulla
horse, of which just now mention I made, if no
the horse, of which I have just made mention, if there be no im-

res impediatur, nemo est, qui non eo, quo
thing may hinder, no one is, who not that, which
pediment, there is no man who cannot more freely use one to

consuevit, libentiùs utatur, quàm
 he has been accustomed, more willingly may use, than
which he has been accustomed, than one that is young and

intractato, et novo: nec modò in hoc, quod est
 unused, and new: nor only in this, which is
unbroken: and not only in this, which is animal,

animal, sed in iis etiam, quæ sunt inanimata,
 animal, but in those also, which are inanimate,
but in those things also which are inanimate, custom

consuetudo valet: cùm locis etiam ipsis montuosis
 custom is strong: when with places also selves mountainous
prevails: since we are delighted even with mountainous

delectemur, et sylvestribus, in quibus diutiùs
 we may be delighted, and woody, in which longer
and woody places in which we have dwelt for a long

commorati sumus. Sed maximum est in amicitia,
 having dwelt we are. But greatest is in friendship,
time. But a very great consideration in friend-

superiorem parem esse inferiori: sæpè enim
 superior equal to be to inferior: often for
ship is, that a superior becomes equal to an inferior: for often there

excellentiæ quædam sunt; qualis erat Scipionis in
 excellencies some are; such as was of Scipio in
are distinguished excellencies; as was that of Scipio, in what

nostro, ut ita dicam, grege. Numquam se ille
 our, as so I may say, flock. Never himself he
I may call our flock. Never did he put himself

Philo, numquam Rupilio, numquam Mummio
 to Philus, never to Rupilius, never to Mummius
above Philus, or Rupilius, or Mummius, or even above friends of

anteponit, numquam inferioris ordinis amicis.
 put before, never inferior of rank to friends.
a rank inferior to these.

Quintum verò Maximum fratrem, egregium virum,
 Quintus indeed Maximus brother, excellent man,
He revered his brother Quintus Maximus, an excellent man,

omninò sibi nequaquam parem, quòd is
 altogether to himself by no means equal, because he
though by no means equal to himself; he revered him because

anteibat ætate, tamquam superiorem colebat,
 was going before in age, as if superior he was cultivating,
he was his senior, as if he had been his superior; and he was

suosque omnes, per se esse ampliores
 his own and all, through themselves to be greater
willing that all his friends should be raised through his means.

volebat. Quod faciendum, imitandumque est
 he was wishing. Which to be done, to be imitated and is
Which should be done, and imitated by all, that if they have

omnibus, ut, si quam præstantiam virtutis, ingenii,
 by all, that, if which excellence of virtue, of disposition,
attained any eminence by means of virtue, genius, or fortune, they

fortunæ consecuti sunt, impertiantque ea suis,
 of fortune having obtained are, may impart and those to own,
may impart and communicate those things to their

communicentque cum proximis; ut, si parentibus
 may communicate and with nearest; that, if from parents
friends; that if they are born

nati sint humilibus, si propinquos habeant
 born they may be humble, if relatives they may have
of humble parents, if they have relatives inferior in mind or

imbecilliores vel animo, vel fortunâ, eorum
 weaker or in mind, or in fortune, of those
fortune, they may increase their resources, and become to them

augeant opes, eisque honori sint, et
 they may increase riches, to them and for honor may be, and
an honor and dignity; as in Fables, those who for some time on

dignitati, ut in Fabulis, qui aliquamdiu propter
 for dignity, as in Fables, who some time on account of
account of an ignorance of their birth and family have been in

ignorationem stirpis, et generis in famulatu
 ignorance of root, and of race in servitude
servitude, when they are known, and discovered to be the sons

fuerint, cùm cogniti sunt, et aut Deorum aut
 may have been, when known are, and or of Gods or
of Gods or of kings, still retain their affection for those

regum filii inventi, retinent tamen caritatem in
 of kings sons found, retain yet charity in
shepherds whom for many years they have considered

pastores, quos patres multos annos esse duxerunt.
 shepherds, whom fathers many years to be they led.
to be their fathers.

Quod equidem est multò profectò magis in veris
 Which indeed is by much indeed more in true
Which indeed ought with far greater reason to be done towards

patribus, certisque faciendum. Fructus enim ingenii,
 fathers, certain and to be made. Fruit for of disposition,
known and real fathers. For then the greatest fruit of

et virtutis, omnisque præstantiæ, tum maximus
 and of virtue, all and of excellence, then greatest
genius, of virtue, and of every excellence is gathered, when it is

capitur, cùm in proximum quemque confertur.
 is taken, when in nearest every one is brought together.
communicated to such as are nearly allied to us.

20. Ut igitur ii, qui sunt in amicitia
 As therefore those, who are in of friendship
As therefore they, who are superior in the connexion of

conjunctionisque necessitudine superiores, exæquare
 of conjunction and necessity superior, to equal
friendship and society, ought to make themselves equal to their

se cum inferioribus debent; sic inferiores non
 themselves with inferiors they owe; so inferiors not
inferiors; so ought inferiors not

dolere, se à suis aut ingenio, aut
 to grieve, themselves by their own or in disposition, or
to grieve that they are exceeded by their friends, in genius, in

fortunâ, aut dignitate superari: quorum plerique aut
 in fortune, or in dignity to be excelled: of whom most or
fortune, or in dignity: most of whom are always

queruntur semper aliquid, aut etiam exprobrant:
 complain always something, or also reprove:
complaining of something, or using expostulation:

eoque magis, si habere se putant, quod
 thus and more, if to have themselves they think, which
and so much the more, if they think that they are able to say that

officiose, et amicè, et cum labore aliquo suo
 diligently, and amicably, and with labor some their own
they have done any kind offices for their friends with any labor

factum queant dicere. Odiosum sanè genus
made they may be able to say. Hateful indeed race
on their own part. Offensive indeed are those who

hominum, officia exprobrantium : quæ
of men, duties of reproving : which
upbraid their friends with the mention of kind offices : which

meminisse debet is, in quem collata sunt,
to have remembered owes he, in whom brought together are,
ought indeed to be remembered by him who has received them, but not

non commemorare, qui contulit. Quamobrem ut
not to commemorate, who brought together. Wherefore as
to be mentioned by him who has conferred them. Wherefore as they

ii, qui superiores sunt, submittere se debent
those, who superior are, to submit themselves they owe
who are superior, ought in friendship to let themselves

in amicitia ; sic quodam modo inferiores extollere :
in friendship ; so some in manner inferior to extol :
down ; so in a certain degree should they raise up their inferiors :

sunt enim quidam, qui molestas amicitias faciunt,
are for some, who troublesome friendships make,
for there are indeed some, who make friendships unpleasant, when

cum ipsi se contemni putant, quod non
when selves themselves to be despised think, which not
they think themselves to be despised ; which scarcely ever happens

ferè contingit, nisi iis, qui etiam contemnendos
almost happens, unless to those, who also to be despised
except to those, who think themselves likely to be de-

se arbitrantur ; qui hâc opinione non modò
themselves think ; who this from opinion not only
spised ; who are to be eased of this opinion not

verbis, sed etiam opere levandi sunt.
by words, but also by work to be lightened are.
only by words, but also by actions.

Tantum autem cuique tribuendum, primum,
So much but to every one to be given, first,
But so much is to be bestowed upon every one, first, as much as

quantum ipse efficere possis ; deinde etiam,
as much as self to effect thou mayst be able ; thence also,
you yourself are able to effect ; then also, as much

quantum ille, quem diligas, atque adjuves,
as much as he, whom thou mayst love, and thou mayst assist,
as he whom you love and assist may be able to sup-

sustinere: non enim tu possis, quantumvis
to sustain: not for thou mayst be able, although
port: for you are not able, however distinguished you

excellas, omnes tuos ad honores amplissimos
thou mayst excel, all thy to honors most ample
may be, to bring all your friends to the highest

perducere: ut Scipio, Publium Rutilium potuit
to lead through: as Scipio, Publius Rutilius has been able
honors: as Scipio was able to make Publius Rutilius

consulem efficere, fratrem ejus Lucium non potuit:
consul to effect, brother of him Lucius not has been able:
consul, but could not effect the same for his brother Lucius:

quòd si etiam possis quidvis deferre ad
that if also thou mayst be able anything to bring down to
but if you are able to effect what you please for another, yet

alterum, videndum est tamen, quid ille possit
another, to be seen is yet, what that may be able
you ought to consider, what he is capable of sup-

sustinere. Omnino amicitiae, corroboratis jam
to sustain. Altogether friendships, strengthened now
porting. Friendships are altogether to be considered, under

confirmatisque et ingeniis et ætatibus judicandæ
confirmed and and by dispositions and by ages to be judged
the circumstances of a confirmed disposition and mature

sunt; nec, si qui ineunte ætate venandi, aut pilæ
are; nor, if who entering age of hunting, or of javelin
age; nor, if any in early youth were interested in the sports of

studiosi fuerint, eos habere necessarios oportet,
studious may have been, those to have necessary it behoves,
hunting or throwing the javelin, is it necessary to preserve as friends

quos tum eodem studio præditos dilexerunt:
whom then the same with study endowed loved:
those whom then they loved as being interested in the same pursuits:

isto enim modo nutrices, et pædagogi jure
that for in manner nurses, and pedagogues by law
for by that rule nurses and teachers will demand the greatest

vetustatis plurimum benevolentiae postulabunt; qui
 of age very much of benevolence will demand; who
share of benevolence by right of age; who

negligendi quidem non sunt, sed alio quodam
 to be neglected indeed not are, but other some
indeed are not to be neglected, but are in some other manner to

modo colendi: aliter amicitiae stabiles
 in manner to be cultivated: otherwise friendships stable
be respected: otherwise friendships cannot be

permanere non possunt. Dispares enim mores,
 to remain through not are able. Unequal for manners,
permanent and stable. For different habits, and

disparia studia sequuntur, quorum dissimilitudo
 unequal studies follow, of which unlikeness
different studies afterwards arise, the difference of which separates

dissociat amicitias: nec ob aliam causam ullam boni
 severs friendships: nor for other cause any good
friendships: nor can the good be friends with the

improbis, improbi bonis amici esse non possunt,
 with wicked, wicked with good friends to be not are able,
wicked, or the wicked with the good, for any other cause, than

nisi quod tanta est inter eos, quanta maxima
 unless that so great is between those, as great as greatest
that there is between them as great a difference as there can be

potest esse, morum studiorumque distantia. Rectè
 is able to be, of manners of studies and distance. Rightly
of manners and pursuits. It may

etiam præcipi potest in amicitiiis, ne intemperata
 also to be taught is able in friendships, not intemperate
be also rightly recommended in friendships, that no excessive degree

quædam benevolentia, (quod persæpè fit) impediât
 some benevolence, (which very often is made) may hinder
of benevolence (as is too often the case) should prevent the dis-

magnas utilitates amicorum: nec enim (ut ad
 great utilities of friends: nor for (that to
charge of important duties: for (to return again to

Fabulas redeam) Trojam Neoptolemus capere
 Fables I may return) Troy Neoptolemus to take
Fables) Neoptolemus would never have been able to take Troy

potuisset, si Lycomedem, apud quem erat
might have been able, if Lycomedes, at whom he was
had he listened willingly to Lycomedes, by whom he had been

educatus, multis cum lacrymis iter suum
educated, many with tears journey his
brought up, and who endeavoured to divert him from the

impedientem, audire voluisset: et sæpè
hindering, to hear might have been willing: and often
expedition: and often

incidunt magnæ res, ut discedendum sit ab
fall upon great things, that to be departed may be from
great affairs render it necessary that friends should be sepa-

amicis; quas qui impedire vult, quòd desiderium
friends; which who to hinder is willing, because desire
rated; and he who wishes to prevent this, because his attach-

non facile ferat, is et infirmus est, mollisque
not easily may bring, he and infirm is, soft and
ment cannot bear separation, is weak and effeminate by nature,

naturâ, et ob eam ipsam causam in amicitia parum
by nature, and for that self cause in friendship little
and on this very account is not rightly adapted for friend-

justus. Atque in omni re considerandum est, et
just. And in every thing to be considered is, and
ship. But in every thing it is to be considered, both what

quid postules ab amico, et quid patiari
what thou mayst ask from a friend, and what thou mayst suffer
you may ask of a friend, and what you may suffer him to obtain

à te impetrari.
from thee to be obtained.
from you.

21. Est etiam quasi quædam calamitas in amicitia

Is also as if some calamity in friendships
But there is also sometimes a painful necessity of break-

dimittendis nonnumquam necessaria: jam enim à
to be dismissed sometimes necessary: now for from
ing off friendships: for now our dis-

sapientium familiaritatibus ad vulgares amicitias oratio
of wise familiarities to common friendships discourse
course descends from the friendships of wise men to speak of

nostra delabitur. Erumpunt sæpè vitia amicorum
 our will glide down. Break out often vices of friends
ordinary friendships. Often the vices of friends break out against

cùm in ipsos amicos, tum in alienos; quorum tamen
 when in selves friends, then in others; of which yet
their own friends, and also against strangers; the disgrace of which

ad amicos redundet infamia: tales igitur amicitiae
 to friends may redound infamy: such therefore friendships
nevertheless redounds to their friends: such friendships therefore

sunt remissione usûs eluendæ, et (ut Catonem
 are by remission of use to be washed away, and (as Cato
are to be abated by gradual neglect, and (as I have heard Cato

dicere audiui) dissuendæ magis, quàm discindendæ:
 to say I heard) to be unsewed more, than to be cut asunder:
say) rather to be unsewed than to be cut asunder:

nisi quædam admodum intolerabilis injuria
 unless some very intolerable injury
unless some very glaring offence may have been committed, so

exarserit, ut neque rectum, neque honestum
 may have burnt out, that nor right, nor honorable
that it is no longer right or honorable, that a separation

sit, neque fieri possit, ut non statim
 may be, nor to be made may be able, that not immediately
and alienation should not immediately take

alienatio disjunctioque facienda sit. Sin autem
 alienation disjoining and to be made may be. But if but
place. But if any

morum, aut studiorum commutatio quædam (ut
 of manners, or of studies change some (as
change of manners or of interests should (as it often happens)

fieri solet) facta erit, aut in reipublicæ
 to be made is accustomed) made shall be, or in of the republic
occur, or if any diversity of opinion in matters of a public

partibus dissensio intercesserit (loquor enim jam,
 parts dissention may have intervened (I speak for now,
nature should arise (for I am now speaking, as I said a little

ut paulò antè dixi, non de sapientium, sed de
 as a little before I said, not from of wise, but from
before, not of the friendships of wise men, but of ordinary friend-

communibus amicitiiis) cavendum erit, ne non
common friendships) to be taken care will be, lest not
ships), care ought to be taken, lest not only friendships should be

solùm amicitiae depositae sed inimicitiae etiam susceptae
only friendships laid down but enmities also undertaken
laid aside, but enmities also should seem to take their

videantur: nihil enim est turpius, quàm cum eo
may be seen: nothing for is more base, than with him
place: for nothing is more base, than to have hostility

bellum gerere, quicum familiaritèr vixeris.
war to carry, whom with familiarly thou mayst have lived.
against him, with whom you have lived on terms of familiarity.

Ab amicitia Quinti Pompeii meo nomine se
From friendship of Quintus Pompeius my by name himself
Scipio (as you know) separated himself from friendship with

removerat (ut scitis) Scipio: propter
had removed (as you know) Scipio: on account of
Quintus Pompey on my account: but he was

dissensionem autem, quæ erat in republicâ, alienatus
dissention but, which was in the republic, alienated
alienated from my colleague Metellus on account of a dissention

est à collegâ nostro Metello: utrumque egit
is from colleague our Metellus: either acted
in public affairs: in either case he acted

gravitèr, auctoritate, et offensione animi non
heavily, by authority, and by offence of mind not
with great steadiness and propriety, and with no unbecoming bitterness

acerbâ. Quamobrem primùm danda opera est,
bitter. Wherefore first to be given assistance is,
of spirit. Care should in the first place be taken that there be

ne qua amicorum discidia fiant; sin, tale
not any of friends separations may be made; but if, such
no separation of friends; but, if any

aliquid evenierit, ut extinctæ potius
something may have happened, that extinguished rather
such event should happen, that friendships may seem rather to

amicitiæ, quàm oppressæ esse videantur.
friendships, than oppressed to be may be seen,
have subsided than to have been violently extinguished.

Cavendum verò est, ne etiam in graves
 To be taken care indeed it is, not also in heavy
We ought also to beware, that friendships do not convert them-
 inimicitias convertant se amicitiae; è quibus
 enmities may convert themselves friendships; from which
selves into bitter enmities; from which

jurgia, maledicta, contumeliae gignantur, quae
 quarrels, evil sayings, contumelies may be produced, which
reproaches, curses, and contumelies may be produced, which yet, if
 tamen, si tolerabiles erunt, ferendae sunt: et hic
 yet, if tolerable shall be, to be brought are: and this
they be tolerable, are to be borne; and this

honor veteri amicitiae tribuendus est, ut is in
 honor old to friendship to be given is, that he in
honor will redound to an old friendship, that he is in fault, who
 culpâ sit, qui faciat, non qui patiat in iuriam.
 fault may be, who may make, not who may suffer injury.
commits, not he who suffers the injury.

Omninò omnium horum vitiorum, atque
 Altogether all these of vices, and
Of all these vices and inconveniences there is one caution to be
 incommodorum una cautio est, atque una provisio,
 of disadvantages one caution is, and one foresight,
given, and one provision to be made; that we do not too hastily

ut ne nimis citò diligere incipiamus, neve non
 that not too much quickly to love we may begin, nor not
commence a friendship, nor form one with the un-

dignos. Digni autem sunt amicitia, quibus in
 worthy. Worthy but are of friendship, whom in
worthy. Now they are worthy of friendship, who possess in them-

ipsis inest causa, cur diligantur: — rarum genus,
 selves is in cause, why they may be loved: — rare race,
selves that which may render them beloved: — a rare class,

(et quidem omnia praeclara rara) nec quidquam
 (and indeed all very clear rare) nor anything
(and indeed all excellent things are rare,) nor is any thing more

difficilius, quàm reperire, quod sit omni ex
 more difficult, than to find, which may be all from
difficult, than to find that, which in every point of view is perfect

parte in suo genere perfectum: sed plerique neque
 part in own race perfected: but most nor
in its own kind: but most persons know

in rebus humanis quidquam bonum nōrunt, nisi
 in things human anything good have known, unless
nothing good in human affairs, except that which is pro-

quod fructuosum sit; et amicos, tamquam pecudes,
 which fruitful may be; and friends, as if cattle,
fitable; and they love their friends as their

eos potissimum diligunt, ex quibus sperant
 those most powerfully they love, from whom they hope
cattle, those the most particularly, from whom they hope that they

se maximum fructum esse capturos. Ita
 themselves greatest fruit to be about to take. So
shall derive the greatest profit. So

pulcherrimā illā, et maximē naturali carent amicitia,
 most beautiful that, and chiefly natural they want friendship,
they are altogether destitute of that most beautiful and most natural

per se, et propter se expetendā:
 through itself, and on account of itself to be sought:
friendship, which is to be sought by means of and on account of itself:

nec ipsi sibi exemplo sunt, hæc vis amicitiae,
 nor selves to themselves for example are, this force of friendship,
nor are they an example to themselves, of what kind and how great

qualis et quanta sit. Ipse enim se quisque
 such as and how great may be. Self for himself every one
is this power of friendship. For every one loves himself,

diligit, non ut aliquam à se ipse mercedem
 loves, not that any from himself self reward
not that he himself may derive any advantage from this love of

exigat caritatis suæ, sed quòd per se sibi
 may exact of charity own, but because through himself to himself
himself, but because every one is by himself dear to him-

quisque carus est; quòd nisi idem in amicitiam
 every one dear is; because unless same in friendship
self; but if this same feeling be not transferred

transferatur, verus amicus numquam reperietur:
 may be brought over, true a friend never will be found:
to friendship, a true friend never will be found:

est enim is quidem tamquam alter idem. Quòd
 is for he indeed as if another the same. That
for that is as it were another self. But if

si hoc apparet in bestiis, volucris, nantibus, agrestibus,
 if this appears in beasts, birds, swimming, rural,
this appears in beasts, birds, fishes, cattle, tame and wild animals,

cicuribus, feris, primum ut se ipsæ diligant
 tame, wild, first that themselves selves may love
that they first love themselves (for that feeling is born with every

(id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur,) *(that for equally with every living is born,)*
 (living thing,) then, that they desire and seek after other

deindè, ut requirant, atque appetant, ad quas
 thence, that they may require, and they may seek, to which
living creatures of the same kind, to which they may

se applicent, ejusdem generis animantes: idque
 themselves may apply, the same of kind living: that and
attach themselves; and they

faciunt cum desiderio, et cum quâdam similitudine
 they make with desire, and with some similitude
do that with eagerness, and with a certain similitude to human

amoris humani: quantò id magis in homine fit
 of love human: by how much that more in man is made
affection: how much more natural is that to man,

naturâ, qui et se ipse diligit, et alterum
 by nature, who and himself self loves, and another
who both loves himself, and seeks after another, whose

anquirit, cujus animum ita cum suo misceat,
 inquires, of whom mind so with own he may mingle,
mind he may so mingle with his own, as to make

ut efficiat pœnè unum ex duobus?
 that he may make almost one from two?
almost one out of two?

22. Sed plerique perversè, ne dicam impudentè,
 But most perversely, not I may say impudently,
But most persons perversely, I may say impudently, wish

amicum habere talem volunt, quales ipsi esse non
 a friend to have such wish, such as selves to be not
to have such a friend as they themselves are not able to

possunt; quæque ipsi non tribuunt amicis, hæc
are able; what and selves not give to friends, these
be; and that which they do not give to their friends, they

ab iis desiderant. Par est autem, primum
from them they desire. Equal is but, first
desire to receive from them. But it is proper, first to be a good

ipsum esse virum bonum, tum alterum similem
self to be man good, then another like
man one's self, and then to seek for another of a similar

sui quærere: in talibus ea, quam jamdudum
of himself to seek: in such that, which already
nature: among such persons, that stability of friend-

tractamus, stabilitas amicitiae, confirmari potest;
we handle, stability of friendship, to be confirmed is able;
ship of which we have already spoken may be confirmed;

cum homines benevolentia conjuncti, primum
when men by benevolence conjoined, first
when men united by benevolence, will first command those desires

cupiditatibus iis, quibus ceteri serviunt, imperabunt,
desires those, which others serve, they will command,
which others obey, then they will rejoice in equity and in

deinde æquitate, justitiæque gaudebunt, omniaque
thence in equity, in justice and will rejoice, all and
justice, and the one will undertake every thing for the

alter pro altero suscipiet; neque quidquam
another for another will undertake; nor anything
other; nor will the one ever

umquam nisi honestum et rectum alter ab altero
ever unless honorable and right another from another
ask of the other anything but that which is honorable and

postulabit; neque solum se colent inter
will demand; nor only themselves they will cultivate among
right; nor will they only esteem and love, but they will also

se, ac diligent, sed etiam verebuntur;
themselves, and they will love, but also they will revere;
reverence each other;

nam maximum ornamentum amicitiae tollit, qui
for greatest ornament of friendship he takes, who
for he that takes away reverence from friendship, takes from it its

ex eâ tollit verecundiam. Itaque in iis perniciosus
 from it takes reverence. Therefore in those pernicious
greatest ornament. It is therefore a pernicious error

est error, qui existimant, libidinum peccatorumque
 is error, who think, of lusts of sins and
in those, who think that a license is given by friendship to all
 omnium patere in amicitia licentiam. Virtutum
 all to lie open in friendship license. Of virtues
kind of lusts and sins. Friendship

amicitia adiutrix à naturâ data est, non vitiorum
 friendship assistant by nature given is, not of vices
was granted by nature as an assistant to virtue, not as a companion

comes: ut, quoniam solitaria non posset
 companion: that, since solitary not might be able
 to vices: that, because solitary virtue cannot arrive at the

virtus ad ea, quæ summa sunt, pervenire,
 virtue to those, which chief are, to come through,
highest excellence, it might attain to greater eminence, when con-

conjuncta et consociata cum alterâ perveniret;
 conjoined and associated with another might come through;
joined and associated with another;

quæ si quos inter societas aut est, aut fuit, aut
 which if whom among society or is, or has been, or
and with whomsoever this association is or has been, or shall be,

futura est, eorum est habendus ad summum
 about to be is, of those is to be had to chief
it may be considered as their best and most blessed guide to the

naturæ bonum optimus beatissimusque comitatus.
 of nature good best most blessed and accompanying.
highest good of nature.

Hæc est, inquam, societas, in quâ omnia insunt,
 This is, I say, society, in which all are in,
This, I say, is an association, in which are comprised all those

quæ putant homines expetenda, honestas, gloria,
 which think men to be sought out, honor, glory,
things, which men think desirable, honor, glory, tranquillity and

tranquillitas animi, atque jucunditas: ut, cum hæc
 tranquillity of mind, and pleasantness: that, when these
pleasure of mind; that when these

adsint, beata vita sit, et sinè his esse non
 may be at, blessed life may be, and without these to be not
 are present, life indeed is happy, and it cannot be happy without

possit. Quod cùm optimum, maximumque
 may be able. Which when best, greatest and
 them. And since this is most excellent and desirable,

sit, si id volumus adipisci, virtuti opera
 may be, if that we are willing to obtain, to virtue labour
 if we wish to attain it, we must pay attention to the principles of

danda est; sinè quâ neque amicitiam, neque
 to be given is; without which nor friendship, nor
 virtue; without which we can neither procure friend-

ullam rem expetendam consequi possumus: eâ
 any thing to be sought out to follow we are able: that
 ship, nor any thing else that is sought after: but

verò neglectâ, qui se amicos habere arbitrantur,
 indeed neglected, who themselves friends to have think,
 if that be neglected, they, who think that they possess friends, then

tum se denique errâsse sentiunt, cùm eos
 then themselves finally to have erred they think, when those
 at length perceive themselves to have erred, when any serious event

gravis aliquis casus experiri cogit. Quocirca
 heavy any fall to try compels. Wherefore
 compels them to try their friends. Wherefore

(dicendum est enim sæpius) cùm judicaveris,
 (to be said is for oftener) when thou mayst have judged,
 (for it cannot be said too often) it is proper to love when you

diligere oportet; non cùm dilexeris,
 to love it behoves; not when thou mayst have loved,
 have judged; not to judge when you have

judicare: sed cùm multis in rebus negligentia
 to judge: but when many in things by negligence
 loved: but since in many affairs we suffer by our own neg-

lectimur, tum maximè in amicis et deligendis,
 we are punished, then most greatly in friends and to be chosen,
 ligence, then most especially in choosing and cultivating friend-

et colendis: præposteris enim utimur consiliis,
 and to be cultivated: preposterous for we use counsels,
 ships: for we use preposterous counsels, and we

et acta agimus, quod vetamur veteri proverbio.
and done we do, which we are forbidden old by proverb.
do what is already done, contrary to the advice of the old proverb.

Nam implicati ultrò et citrò, vel usu diuturno, vel
For involved to and fro, or by use long, or
For after having been engaged in friendship, by long habit and
etiam officiis, repentè in medio cursu amicitias,
also by duties, suddenly in middle course friendships,
also by mutual good offices, suddenly we break asunder our attachments
exortâ aliquâ offensione, dirumpimus.
having sprung from some offence, we break asunder.
in the midst of their course, owing to some recent cause of offence.

23. Quò etiam magis vituperanda est rei
By which also more to be blamed is of a thing
So much the more is so great negligence to be blamed in

maximè necessariæ tanta incuria. Una est enim
most greatly necessary so great carelessness. One is for
an affair of such great interest. For friendship is

amicitia in rebus humanis, de cujus utilitate omnes
friendship in things human, from of which usefulness all
one of those interests among human concerns, of the usefulness of

uno ore consentiunt; quamquam à multis ipsa
one with mouth think together; although by many self
which all are of one opinion; although by many virtue itself

virtus contemnitur, et venditatio quædam atque
virtue is despised, and display some and
is despised, and is said to be merely a certain display and osten-
ostentatio esse dicitur: multi divitias despiciunt,
ostentation to be is said: many riches despise,
tation: many despise riches, who being

quos parvo contentos tenuis victus cultusque delectat:
whom little content slender food dress and delights:
content with little are satisfied with slender food and clothing:

honores verò, quorum cupiditate quidam inflamman-
honors indeed, of which by desire some are inflamed,
honors indeed, by the desire of which some are inflamed,—how

quàm multi ita contemnunt, ut nihil inanius,
how many so despise, that nothing more empty,
many so despise them, as to think nothing more empty, nothing

nihil levius esse existiment: itemque cetera,
 nothing more light to be they may think: also and others,
more trifling: and also other things,

quæ quibusdam admirabilia videntur, permulti sunt,
 which to some admirable are seen, very many are,
which seem admirable to some persons,—there are very many, who

qui pro nihilo putent: de amicitîâ omnes ad
 who for nothing may think: from friendship all to
regard them as things of no value: but all without exception

unum idem sentiunt, et ii, qui ad rempublicam
 one the same think, and those, who to the republic
think the same on the subject of friendship, those who give them-

se contulerunt, et ii, qui rerum cognitione
 themselves brought together, and those, who of things with knowledge
selves to the business of the state, and those who are delighted with

doctrinâque delectantur, et ii, qui suum
 with learning and are delighted, and those, who own
the pursuits of knowledge and learning, and those who quietly

negotium gerunt otiosi; postremò, ii, qui se
 business carry leisurely; lastly, those, who themselves
attend to their own business; lastly, those who give themselves

totos tradiderunt voluptatibus, sinè amicitîâ vitam
 whole gave up to pleasures, without friendship life
up entirely to pleasure, perceive that life is nothing without friend-

esse nullam sentiunt, si modò velint aliquâ
 to be none think, if only they may be willing some
ship, if they wish in any respect to live with some degree of

ex parte liberalitè vivere: serpit enim, nescio
 from part freely to live: creeps for, I know not
refinement: for friendship creeps, I know

quomodò, per omnium vitas amicitia, nec ullam
 how, through of all lives friendship, nor any
not how, through the lives of all, nor does it allow of any mode

ætatis degendæ rationem patitur esse expertem sui.
 of age to be led reason suffers to be free from itself.
of spending life without its aid.

Quinetiam si quis eâ asperitate est, et immanitate
 Moreover if any that of asperity is, and of cruelty
Moreover if any one be of that asperity and harshness of nature,

naturæ, congressus ut hominum fugiat, atque
 of nature, the assemblies that of men he may flee, and
 as to flee from the haunts of men, and to hate mankind,

oderit, qualem fuisse Athenis Timonem
 may have hated, such as to have been at Athens Timon
 such as we have heard a certain Timon at Athens to

nescio quem accepimus: tamen is pati non
 I know not whom we received: yet he to suffer not
 have been: yet he would not be able to

possit, ut non anquirat aliquem, apud quem
 may be able, that not may inquire some one, at whom
 endure that he should not seek for some one, to whom he might give

evomat virus acerbitalis suæ. Atque hoc maximè
 he may vent poison of bitterness his. And this most greatly
 vent to the bitterness of his malignity. And this more especially

judicaretur, si quid tale posset contingere, ut
 may be judged, if anything such might be able to happen, that
 may be judged, if such a thing could happen, that some God should

aliquis nos Deus ex hac hominum frequentia
 any us God from this of men concourse
 take us away from this concourse of human beings, and should

tolleret, et in solitudine uspiam collocaret,
 might take, and in solitude anywhere might place together,
 place us in some solitude, and there supplying us with a full and

atque ibi suppetans omnium rerum, quas natura
 and there supplying all of things, which nature
 rich abundance of all things which nature desires, should

desiderat, abundantiam et copiam, hominis omninò
 desires, abundance and plenty, of man altogether
 exclude us altogether from all intercourse with human

adspiciendi potestatem eriperet: quis tam
 to be looked to power might snatch from: who so
 society: who would

esset ferreus, qui eam vitam ferre posset,
 might be of iron, who that life to bring might be able,
 be so iron-hearted, who would be able to bear that life, and

cuique non auferret fructum voluptatum
 to whom and not might take away fruit of pleasures
 from whom would not solitude take away all enjoyment of

omnium solitudo? Verum ergò illud est, quod
 all solitude? True therefore that is, which
pleasure? True therefore is that saying, which

à Tarentino Archytâ, ut opinor, dici solitum,
 by Tarentine Archytas, as I think, to be said accustomed,
used to be uttered by Archytas of Tarentum, as I believe, which

nostros senes commemorare audivi, ab aliis senibus
 our old men to commemorate I heard, from other old men
I have heard our old men repeat, and which they had heard from other

auditum, Si quis in cœlum ascendisset,
 heard, If any one in heaven might have ascended,
old men, If any one should ascend up to heaven, and

naturamque mundi, et pulchritudinem siderum
 nature and of the world, and beauty of stars
observe the nature of the world and the beauty of the

perspexisset, insuavem illam admirationem ei
 might have seen through, unpleasant that admiration to him
stars, that admirable sight would be unpleasant to

fore; quæ jucundissima fuisset, si
 to be about to be; which most pleasant might have been, if
him; but might become most delightful if he had

aliquem cui narraret, habuisset. Sic
 any one to whom he might relate, he might have had. So
any one to whom he might relate his pleasures. So.

natura solitarium nihil amat, semperque ad aliquod
 nature solitary nothing loves, always and to some
nature loves nothing solitary, and always leans as it were on

tamquam adminiculum annititur; quod in amicissimo
 as if support leans upon; which in most friendly
something for support; which is most pleasant

quoque dulcissimum est.
 every most sweet is.
in friendship.

24. Sed cùm tot signis eadem natura declaret,
 But when so many by signs the same nature may declare,
But when the same nature declares by so many tokens,

quid velit, anquirat, ac desideret; obsurdscimus
 what may wish, may inquire, and may desire; we are deaf
what it wishes, seeks after, and desires; yet we are, I know

tamen nescio quomodò; nec ea, quæ ab eâ
 yet I know not how; nor those, which by it
 not how, inattentive to it; nor do we hear those things,

monemur, audimus: est enim varius et multiplex
 we are advised, we hear: is for various and manifold
 to which it exhorts us: for the use of friendship is various

usus amicitiae, multæque causæ suspicionum,
 use of friendship, many and causes of suspicions,
 and manifold, and many causes of suspicion and of offence are

offensionumque dantur; quas tum evitare, tum
 of offences and are given; which then to escape, then
 given; which it is the part of a wise

elevare, tum ferre, sapientis est. Una illa
 to extenuate, then to bring, of wise is. One that
 man to avoid, to extenuate, to bear with. That one

sublevanda offensio est, ut et utilitas in amicitia,
 to be lightened offence is, that and usefulness in friendship,
 cause of offence must be borne, that the usefulness and fidelity of

et fides retineatur: nam et monendi amici
 and faith may be retained: for and to be advised friends
 friendship may be preserved: for friends are often to be ad-

sæpè sunt, et objurgandi: et hæc accipienda
 often are, and to be reproved: and these to be received
 monished, and to be reproved: and these things are to be

amicè, cum benevolè fiunt. Sed nescio
 amicably, when benevolently are made. But I know not
 received with a friendly spirit when kindly done. But I know not

quomodò verum est, quod in *Andria* familiaris
 how true is, which in *The Andria* familiar
 how true it is, which my friend says in "*The*

meus dicit:

my says:
Andria:"

Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Compliance friends, truth hatred produces.

Complaisance procures friends, but truth causes hatred.

Molesta veritas, si quidem ex eâ nascitur odium,
 Troublesome truth, if indeed from that is born hatred,
 Troublesome is truth, if indeed from that arises hatred, which is

quod est venenum amicitiae: sed obsequium multò
 which is poison of friendship: but compliance by much
the poison of friendship: but complaisance is far more

molestius, quod peccatis indulgens, præcipitem
 more troublesome, which sins indulging, headlong
troublesome, which indulges vice, and permits a friend to fall into

amicum ferri sinit: maxima autem culpa in
 a friend to be brought permits: greatest but fault in
ruin: but the greatest fault is in

eo est, qui et veritatem aspernatur, et in fraudem
 him is, who and truth despises, and in fraud
him, who despises truth, and is driven by complaisance into

obsequio impellitur. Omnis igitur hâc in re
 by compliance is driven on. Every therefore this in thing
fraud. All care and diligence must therefore

habenda ratio et diligentia est; primùm, ut monitio
 to be had reason and diligence is; first, that advice
be used in this matter; first, that advice be without

acerbitate, deindè objurgatio contumeliâ careat:
 bitterness, thence reproof reproach may want:
bitterness, and then that reproof be unmingled with reproach:

in obsequio autem (quoniam Terentiano verbo
 in compliance but (since Terentian word
but in complaisance, (since I willingly use the expression of

lubentèr utimur) comitas adsit: assentatio,
 willingly we use) affability may be at: flattery,
Terence) there may be affability: flattery, the

vitiorum adjutrix, procul amoveatur, quæ non modò
 of vices assistant, far off may be removed from, which not only
nurse of vices, should be far removed, which is not only unworthy

amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est: alitèr
 of a friend, but not free indeed worthy is: otherwise
of a friend, but even of a free man: there is

enim cum tyranno, alitèr cum amico vivitur.
 for with a tyrant, otherwise with a friend is lived.
one mode of living with a tyrant, and another of living with a friend.

Cujus autem aures veritati clausæ sunt, ut ab
 Of whom but ears to truth shut are, that from
His safety is to be despaired of, whose ears are so shut to truth,

amico verum audire nequeat, hujus salus desperanda
 a friend truth to hear may be unable, of this safety to be despaired
 that he cannot bear to hear it even from a

est: scitum est enim illud Catonis, ut multa,
 is: known is for that of Cato, as many,
 friend: well known is that saying of Cato, as many others, "Some

Melius de quibusdam acerbos inimicos mereri,
 Better from some bitter enemies to deserve,
 persons are more indebted to bitter enemies, than to those who

quàm eos amicos, qui dulces videantur; illos verum
 than those friends, who sweet may be seen; those true
 appear sweet friends: those often

sæpè dicere, hos numquam. Atque illud absurdum
 often to say, these never. And that absurd
 speak the truth, these never." And it is absurd, that they

est, quòd ii, qui monentur, eam molestiam, quam
 is, because those, who are advised, that trouble, which
 who are advised, do not take that trouble, which they ought

debent capere, non capiunt; eam capiunt, quâ
 they owe to take, not they take; that they take, which
 to take; but take that trouble, which

debent vacare: peccasse enim se non
 they owe to be empty: to have sinned for themselves not
 they should be without: for they do not regret that they have

anguntur, objurgari molestè ferunt: quod
 are vexed, to be rebuked troublesomely they bring: which
 done wrong, but they take it ill that they are reproved; which

contrà oportebat, delicto dolere, correctione
 against it was behoving, in a fault to grieve, in correction
 ought to be reversed, to grieve for the fault, to rejoice in the

gaudere.
 to rejoice.
 correction.

25. Ut igitur et monere, et moneri, proprium

As therefore and to advise, and to be advised, peculiar
 As therefore both to advise, and to be advised is the

est veræ amicitiae, et alterum liberè facere, non
 is true of friendship, and another freely to make, not
 property of true friendship, and to do the one freely, not harshly,

asperè, alterum patientèr accipere, non repugnantèr ;
roughly, another patiently to accept, not repugantly ;
to receive the other patiently and not repugantly ;

sic habendum est, nullam in amicitii pestem esse
so to be had is, no in friendships plague to be
so it should be considered that there is no greater foe to friendships

majo rem, quàm adulationem, blanditiam, assentationem :
greater, than fawning, compliment, flattery :
than flattery, fawning, and adulation :

quamvis enim multis nominibus est hoc vitium
although for many by names is this vice
for, though under many names, this vice is to be marked as the

notandum, levium hominum atque fallacium, ad
to be marked, light of men and deceitful, to
vice of hollow and deceitful men, saying every thing according

voluntatem loquentium omnia, nihil ad veritatem.
will speaking all, nothing to truth.
to inclination, and nothing according to truth.

Cùm autem omnium rerum simulatio est vitiosa,
When but all of things feigning is vicious,
But since the pretending of all things is vicious, (as it takes

(tollit enim judicium veri, idque adulterat)
(takes for judgment of truth, that and adulterates)
away the judgment of truth, and adulterates it,) it also is decidedly

tum amicitiae repugnat maximè : delet enim
then friendship resists. most greatly : blots out for
hostile to friendship : for it destroys

veritatem, sine quâ nomen amicitiae valere non
truth, without which name of friendship to be strong not
truth, without which the name of friendship cannot

potest : nam cùm amicitiae vis sit in eo, ut
is able : for when of friendship force may be in it, that
avail : for since the force of friendship is in this ; that one mind,

unus quasi animus fiat ex pluribus, quî id
one as if mind may be made from many, by which it
as it were, is made of many,—how can that happen, if there be

fieri poterit, si ne in uno quidem quoque
to be made shall be able, if not in one indeed every
not in every one of them, always one and the same

unus animus erit, idemque semper, sed varius,
 one mind will be, the same and always, but various,
but a varying, complex, and fluctuating

commutabilis, multiplex? quid enim potest esse tam
 interchangeable, manifold? what for is able to be so
mind? for what can be so flexible and

flexibile, tam devium, quàm animus ejus, qui ad
 flexible, so wandering, as mind of him, who to
so wandering, as the mind of him, who is moved not only accord-

alterius non modò sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam
 of another not only sense and will, but also
ing to the sense and will of another, but also by his very look

vultum atque nutum convertitur?
 countenance and nod is turned about?
and nod?

Negat	quis?	nego:	ait?	aio:	postremò,
Denies	who?	I deny:	he says?	I say:	lastly,
Does any one deny?		I deny:	does he affirm?	I affirm:	in short I

imperavi egomet mihi
 have commanded I myself to me
have brought myself

Omnia assentari,
 All to flatter,
to assent to every thing,

Ut ait idem Terentius; sed ille sub Gnathonis
 As says same Terence; but that under of Gnatho
As says the Terence; but he speaks under the character

personâ; quod amici genus adhibere, omninò levitatis
 person; which of a friend kind to admit, altogether of lightness
of Gnatho;—to admit of such a friend is altogether a mark of

est. Multi autem Gnathonum similes cùm sint,
 is. Many but of Gnathos like when may be,
levity. But as there are many like Gnatho, superior to him in

loco, fortunâ, famâ superiores: horum est
 in place, in fortune, in fame higher: of these is
situation in fortune, in fame: the flattery of

assentatio molesta, cùm ad vanitatem
 flattery troublesome, when to vanity
these is injurious, when authority is added to

accessit auctoritas. Secerni autem
has approached authority. To be separated but
vanity. But a flatterer may

blandus amicus à vero, et internosci, tam
flattering a friend from true, and to be distinguished, so
with a proper degree of diligence be discriminated and distinguished

potest, adhibitâ diligentîâ, quàm omnia fucata, et
is able, admitted diligence, as all coloured, and
from a true friend, as all coloured and artificial objects may be

simulata à sinceris, atque veris. Concio, quæ ex
feigned from sincere, and true. An assembly, which from
distinguished from the real and true. An assembly, which is

imperitissimis constat, tamen judicare solet,
most unskilful stands together, yet to judge is accustomed,
composed of unskilful persons, yet is accustomed to judge of the

quid intersit inter popularem, id est, assentatorem
what may be between between popular, that is, flatterer
difference between a demagogue, that is, a flatterer and a

et levem civem, et inter constantem, severum, et
and light citizen, and between constant, severe, and
heartless citizen, and a steady, firm and conscientious

gravem. Quibus blanditiis Caius Papirius nuper
heavy. What with compliments Caius Papirius lately
man. With what compliments Caius Papirius lately in-

influebat in aures concionis, cùm ferret Legem
was flowing in in ears of an assembly, when he might bring the law
dulged the ears of the assembly, when he brought in the law con-

de Tribunis Plebis reficiendis?
from Tribunes of the common people to be made again?
cerning the re-election of the Tribunes of the People?

Dissuasimus nos. Sed nihil de me; de Scipione
Dissuaded we. But nothing from me; from Scipio
I opposed him. But to say nothing of myself; I may speak

dicam libentiùs. Quanta illa, Dii immortales!
I may say more willingly. How great that, O Gods immortal!
freely of Scipio. How great, O ye immortal Gods!

fuit gravitas? quanta in oratione majestas? ut facilè
has been weight? how great in speech majesty? as easily
was the weight and majesty of his speech? that you

ducem Populi Romani, non comitem diceres :
 leader of people Roman, not companion thou mightest say :
might easily observe the leader not the companion of the Roman people :

sed affuistis, et est in manibus oratio : itaque
 but thou hast been at, and is in hands speech : therefore
but you were present, and the speech is in your possession : therefore

lex popularis suffragiis populi repudiata est. Atque
 law popular by votes of people rejected is. And
the popular law was rejected by the votes of the people. And (to

(ut ad me redeam) meministis, Quinto
 (that to me I may return) thou hast remembered, Quintus
return to myself) you remember when Quintus Maximus, the

Maximo, fratre Scipionis, et Lucio Mancino consulibus,
 Maximus, brother of Scipio, and Lucius Mancinus consuls,
brother of Scipio, and Lucius Mancinus were consuls, how popu-

quàm popularis lex de Sacerdotiis Caii Licinii
 how popular law from priesthoods of Caius Licinius
lar the law of Caius Licinius Crassus concerning priesthood ap-

Crassi videbatur? cooptatio enim collegiorum ad
 Crassus was seen? the choosing for of colleges to
peared? for the choosing of colleges was trans-

populi beneficium transferebatur. Atque is primum
 of people benefit was transferred. And he firstly
ferred to the benefit of the people. And he first began to

instituit in forum versus, agere cum populo : tamen
 instituted in forum turned, to do with the people : yet
address the people with his back turned towards the forum : yet the

illius vendibilem orationem religio deorum
 of that saleable speech religion of gods
religion of the immortal Gods, aided by our exertions, easily

immortalium, nobis defendentibus, facile vincebat :
 immortal, us keeping off, easily was conquering :
triumphed over that venal oration of his :

atque id actum est, prætor me, quinquennio antè,
 and it done is, prætor me, five years before,
and that was done, when I was prætor, five years before I was

quàm consul sum factus : itaque re magis, quàm
 than consul I am made : therefore by thing more, than
made consul : therefore by fact, rather than by

summâ auctoritate, causa illa defensa est.
 chief by authority, cause that kept off is.
high authority, that cause was defended.

26. Quòd si in scenâ, id est, in concione, in
 Because if in scene, that is, in an assembly, in
But if in a scene, that is, in an assembly in which there

quâ rebus fictis et adumbratis loci plurimum
 which for things feigned and shadowed of place very much
is much room for invention and imagination, yet that which is

est, tamen verum valet, (si modò id patefactum et
 is, yet true is strong, (if only it opened and
true prevails, (if only it be laid open and made manifest,) what

illustratum est) quid in amicitîâ fieri oportet, quæ
 brightened is) what in friendship to be made behoves, which
ought to be done in friendship, which is entirely estimated by

tota veritate perpenditur? in quâ nisi, (ut dicitur)
 whole by truth is well weighed? in which unless, (as is said)
truth? in which unless (as it is said)

apertum pectus videas, tuumque ostendas,
 opened breast thou mayst see, thy and thou mayst show,
you can see the open breast, and exhibit your own, you can have

nihil fidum, nihil exploratum habeas: ne
 nothing faithful, nothing explored thou mayst have: not
nothing faithful, nothing known: not

amare quidem aut amari, cùm id, quàm verè
 to love indeed or to be loved, when that, how truly
even whether you love or are loved, when you are ignorant, how

fiat, ignores. Quamquam ista
 may be made, thou mayst be ignorant. However that
far there may be sincerity. Although that flattery,

assentatio, quamvis perniciosa sit, nocere tamen
 flattery, although destructive may be, to hurt yet
however pernicious it may be, cannot injure any one except

nemini potest, nisi ei, qui eam recipit, atque
 nobody is able, unless him, who it receives, and
him who receives it and is delighted with

eâ delectatur: ita fit, ut is assentatoribus
 with it is delighted: so is made, that he to flatterers
it; so it happens, that he opens his ears most

patefaciat aures suas maximè, qui ipse sibi
 may open ears own most greatly, who self himself
readily to flatterers, who flatters himself, and who is most

assentetur, et se maximè ipse delectet.
 may flatter, and himself most greatly self may delight.
pleased with himself.

Omninò est amans sui virtus: optimè enim se
 Altogether is loving of itself virtue: best for itself
Virtue entirely approves of itself: for it best knows

ipsa novit, quàmque amabilis sit, intelligit: ego
 self knew, how and lovely may be, understands: I
itself, and understands how lovely it is: but

autem non de virtute nunc loquor, sed de virtutis
 but not from virtue now speak, but from of virtue
I am not now speaking of virtue, but of a conceit of

opinione: virtute enim ipsâ non tam multi præditi
 opinion: with virtue for self not so many endowed
virtue: for there are not so many who wish to be virtuous,

esse, quàm videri volunt. Hos delectat assentatio:
 to be, as to be seen are willing. These delights flattery:
as who desire to appear virtuous. Flattery therefore delights these;

his fictus ad ipsorum voluntatem sermo cùm
 to these feigned to of selves will discourse when
when a discourse adapted to their wishes is addressed to these per-

adhibetur, orationem illam vanam, testimonium esse
 is admitted, speech that vain, testimony to be
sons, they think that vain oration to be a testimony to their own

laudum suarum putant: nulla est igitur hæc
 of praises own they think: no is therefore this
praise: there is therefore no friend-

amicitia, cùm alter verum audire non vult, alter
 friendship, when other true to hear not is willing, other
ship, when the one does not wish to hear what is true, and the other

ad mentiendum paratus est. Nec parasitorum in
 to to lie prepared is. Nor of parasites in
is ready to say what is false. Nor would the flattery of

Comœdiis assentatio nobis faceta videretur, nisi
 Comedies flattery to us facetious might be seen, unless
parasites in Comedies appear facetious to us, if there were no vain-

essent milites gloriosi:
 they might be soldiers glorious:
 glorious soldiers:

Magnas verò agere gratias Thais mihi?
 Great but to act thanks Thais to me?
 But did Thais really return me great thanks?

Satis erat respondere, *Magnas: Ingentes*, inquit:
 Enough it was to answer, Great: *Prodigious*, he says:
 It was enough to answer, "Great:" but he says "Prodigious!"

semper auget assentator id, quod is, cujus ad
 always increases a flatterer that, which he, of whom to
 a flatterer always increases that which he, according to whose will
 voluntatem dicitur, vult esse magnum. Quamobrem,
 will is said, is willing to be great. Wherefore,
 it is said, wishes to be great. Wherefore,

quamvis blanda ista vanitas apud eos valeat, qui
 although courteous that vanity at those may be strong who
 although that courteous vanity may prevail with those who them-

ipsi illam allectant et invitant, tamen etiam graviore
 selves that allure and invite, yet also heavier
 selves attract and invite it, yet even the more grave and steady

constantioresque admonendi sunt, ut animum
 more constant and to be admonished they are, that the mind
 are to be admonished, that they do not suffer their mind to be

advertant, ne callidâ assentatione capiantur:
 they may turn to, not crafty by flattery they may be taken:
 imposed on by crafty flattery:

apertè enim adulantem nemo non videt, nisi qui
 openly for flattering nobody not sees, unless who
 for every one can readily see an open flatterer, unless he be very

admodum est excors: callidus ille, et occultus ne
 very is heartless: crafty that, and hidden not
 stupid indeed: the greatest care should be taken lest

se insinuet, studiosè cavendum est: nec
 himself may insinuate, studiously to be taken care is: nor
 the crafty and disguised flatterer should insinuate himself: for

enim facillimè agnoscitur, quippe qui etiam
 for most easily is acknowledged, for who also
 he is not very easily recognized, as he often flatters even by

adversando sæpè assentetur; et litigare se simulans,
by opposing often may flatter; and to strive himself pretending,
opposing; and compliments under pretence

blandiatur, atque ad extremum det manus,
may flatter, and to extreme may give hands,
of contradicting, and at last surrenders and owns himself to be

vincique se patiatur: ut is, qui illusus
to be conquered and himself may suffer: that he, who mocked
conquered: that he, who is thus

sit, plus vidisse videatur: quid autem
may be, more to have seen may be seen: what but
mocked, may seem to have seen more: but what is more

turpius, quàm illudi? quod ne accadat, magis
more base, than to be mocked? which not may happen, more
disgraceful, than to be deceived? against which event the more

cavendum est, ut in *Epiclero*:
to be taken care is, as in *Epiclerus*:
care is to be taken, as in Epiclerus:

Hodie me ante omnes comicos stultos senes
To day me before all comic foolish old men
You have this day most completely deceived and mocked

Versâris, atque luseris lautissimè:
Thou mayst have turned, and thou mayst have played most handsomely:
Me beyond all old comic fools:

hæc enim etiam in Fabulis stultissima persona est
this for also in Fables most foolish person is
for this is even in Comedies the most foolish character of thought-

improvidorum et credulorum senum. Sed
improvident and credulous of old men. But
less and credulous old men. But

nescio quo pacto ab amicitiiis perfectorum
I know not what by agreement from friendships perfected
our discourse has, I know not by what means, descended from the

hominum, id est, sapientium, (de hæc dico
of men, that is, wise, (from this I say
friendships of perfect, that is of wise men, (of this wisdom I speak,

sapientiâ, quæ videtur in hominem cadere posse)
wisdom, which is seen in man to fall to be able)
which seems able to fall to the lot of man,) to the friendships of

ad leves amicitias deflexit oratio. Quamobrem ad
to light friendships bent down speech. Wherefore to
foolish people. Wherefore let us

illa: prima redeamus, eaque ipsa concludamus
those first we may return, those and selves we may shut up
return to the first named, and with them con-
aliquando.
sometimes.
clude.

27. Virtus, virtus, inquam, Caii Fanni, et
Virtue, virtue, I say, O Caius Fannius, and
Virtue, virtue, I say, O Caius Fannius, and thou, O

tu, Quinte Muci, et conciliat amicitias, et
thou, O Quintus Mucius, and conciliates friendships, and
Quintus Mucius, both conciliates and preserves friend-

conservat: in eâ est enim convenientia rerum, in
preserves: in it is for the agreeing of things, in
ships: for in it is the agreeing of all things, in it is

eâ stabilitas, in eâ constantia; quæ cum se
it firmness, in it constancy; which when itself
stability, in it is constancy; which when it has

extulit, et ostendit lumen suum, et idem
it raised up, and shewed light its own, and the same
lifted itself up, and has showed its own light, and has looked at

aspexit agnovitque in alio, ad id se adinovel,
looked to acknowledged and in other, to it itself moves to,
and recognized the same in another, it applies itself to it, and

vicissimque accipit illud, quod in altero est: ex
mutually and accepts that, which in other is: from
mutually receives that, which is in another: from

quo eorum exardescit sive amor, sive amicitia;
which of those burns forth or love, or friendship;
which there burns forth love or friendship;

utrumque enim dictum est ab amando: amare
each for said is from loving: to love
for both have their name from loving: but to

autem nihil aliud est, nisi eum ipsum diligere,
but nothing other is, unless him self to love,
love is nothing else, than to be attached to him whom you love,

quem ames, nullâ indigentiâ, nullâ utilitate
 whom thou mayst love, no from want, no from utility
from no feeling of want or with any views of ad-
 quæsitiâ. Quæ tamen ipsa efflorescit ex amicitia,
 sought for. Which yet self springs out from friendship,
vantage. Which yet itself springs from friendship, even if you

etiam si tu eam minùs sequutus sis: hæc
 also if thou it less having followed mayst be: this
do not seek it: with

nos adolescentes benevolentia, senes illos Lucium
 we youths by benevolence, old men those Lucius
this benevolence we, young persons, have loved those old men

Paullum, Marcum Catonem, Caium Gallum, Publium
 Paullus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius
Lucius Paullus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus, Publius

Nasicam, Tiberium Gracchum, Scipionis nostri
 Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, of Scipio our
Nasica, Tiberius Gracchus, the father-in-law of our

socerum, dileximus: hæc etiam magis elucet inter
 father-in-law, we loved: this also more shines out among
Scipio: but this also shines out more among

æquales, ut inter me et Scipionem, Lucium Furium,
 equals, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius,
equals, as between me and Scipio, Lucius Furius,

Publium Rupilium, Spurium Mummius: vicissim
 Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius: alternately
Publius Rupilius, Spurius Mummius: in like

autem senes in adolescentium caritate acquiescimus;
 but old men in of young men charity we acquiesce;
manner old men may have a friendship for the young;

ut in vestra, ut in Quinti Tuberonis: equidem etiam
 as in your, as in of Quintus Tubero: indeed also
as in the case of you and Quintus Tubero: indeed also I am

admodum adolescentis, Publii Rutilii, Auli Virginii
 very of a young man, Publius Rutilius, Aulus Virginius
delighted with the friendship of a very young man, Publius Rutilius,

familiaritate delector. Quoniamque ita ratio
 by familiarity I am delighted. Since and so reason
and of Aulus Virginius. And because so the condition

comparata est vitæ naturæque nostræ, ut alia ætas
 compared is of life of nature and our, that other age
of our life and nature is arranged, that another age may

oriatur; maximè quidem optandum est, ut cum
 may arise; most greatly indeed to be wished is, that with
rise; most particularly indeed is it to be wished, that you

æqualibus possis, quibuscum, tamquam è
 equals thou mayst be able, whom with, as if from
may be able to arrive at the end of your course with

carceribus emissus sis, cum iisdem ad calcem,
 prisons sent out thou mayst be, with the same to the heel,
those with whom you first set out as from a starting-

ut dicitur, pervenire. Sed quoniam res humanæ
 as it is said, to come through. But since things human
post. But because human affairs are

fragiles caducæque sunt, semper aliqui anquirendi
 frail falling and are, always some to be inquired for
frail and perishing, others are always to be sought for, whom we

sunt, quos diligamus, et à quibus diligamur:
 are, whom we may love, and by whom we may be loved:
may love, and by whom we may be loved:

caritate enim benevolentiaque sublatâ, omnis est
 charity for benevolence and being lifted up, all is
for affection and benevolence being taken away, all pleasure is re-

è vitâ sublata jucunditas. Mibi quidem Scipio,
 from life lifted up pleasantness. To me indeed Scipio,
moved from life. To me indeed Scipio, al-

quamquam est subito ereptus, vivit tamen,
 although is suddenly snatched from, lives yet,
though he was suddenly snatched away, yet lives, and always will

semperque vivet: virtutem enim amavi illius viri,
 always and will live: virtue for I loved that of man,
live: for I loved the virtue of that man, which

quæ extincta non est: nec mihi soli versatur ante
 which extinguished not is: nor to me alone is turned before
is not extinguished: nor is his virtue always present to

oculos, qui illam semper in manibus habui, sed etiam
 eyes, who that always in hands I had, but also
me only, who constantly had it before me, but also to posterity it

posteris erit clara et insignis: nemo umquam
to posterity will be bright and remarkable: nobody ever
will be distinguished and remarkable: no one will ever

animo, aut spe majora suscipiet, qui sibi non
in mind, or in hope greater will undertake, who to himself not
meditate or expect great things, who will not place before himself

illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.
of him memory and image to be proposed may think.
the memory and image of that great man.

Equidem ex omnibus rebus, quas mihi aut fortuna,
Indeed from all things, which to me or fortune,
Indeed of all things, which fortune or nature has bestowed upon

aut natura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia
or nature bestowed, nothing I have which with friendship
me, I possess nothing which I can compare with the friendship of

Scipionis possim comparare. In hac mihi de
of Scipio I may be able to compare. In this to me from
Scipio. In this friendship I

republicâ consensus, in hac rerum privatarum
the republic agreement, in this of things private
found assistance in public affairs, in this I had council in my private

consilium; in eâdem requies plena oblectationis
counsel; in the same repose full of delight
concerns; in the same I enjoyed a leisure full of de-

fuit; numquam illum ne minimâ quidem re
has been; never him not least indeed in thing
light; never did I offend him in the slightest particular, as

offendi, quod quidem senserim; nihil audi-
I offended, which indeed I may have perceived; nothing I heard
far as I have observed; I never heard

ex eo ipse, quod nollem; una domus
from him self, which I might be unwilling; one house
from him any thing which I wished not to hear; we had but one

erat, idem victus, isque communis; neque solùm
was, the same food, that and common; nor only
house, the same food, and that in common; nor only were we

militia, sed etiam peregrinationes rusticationesque
war, but also travellings dwellings in the country and
together in war, but we always took the same journeys, and were

communes.

common. *Nam quid ego de studiis*
For what I from studies
together in our rural retirements. And what shall I say of our

dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid, atque discendi,
I will say of knowing always something, and of learning,
desire of always knowing and learning something, in which pursuit;

in quibus remoti ab oculis populi omne otiosum
in which removed from eyes of the people all leisurely
remote from the public eye, we spent all our leisure

tempus contrivimus? Quarum rerum recordatio, et
time we broke? Which of things recollection, and
time? If the recollection and memory of these

memoria, si unà cum illo occidisset, desiderium
memory, if together with him might have fallen, desire
things had perished together with him, I could by no means bear

conjunctissimi atque amantissimi viri ferre nullo
most conjoined and most loving of man to bring no
the regret of the loss of so dear and affectionate a

modo possem: sed nec illa extincta sunt,
by manner I might be able: but nor those extinguished are,
friend: but they are not extinct, they are

alunturque potius, et augentur cogitatione
they are nourished and rather, and they are increased by thought
rather nourished and increased by thought and

et memoriâ: et si illis planè orbatus essem,
and by memory: and if of them plainly deprived I might be,
memory: and if I were altogether deprived of them, yet

magnum tamen afferet mihi ætas ipsa solatium;
great yet might bring to me age self consolation;
my very age would afford me a great consolation;

diutius enim jam in hoc desiderio esse non possum.
longer for now in this desire to be not I am able.
for I cannot much longer remain in this sad regret.

Omnia autem brevia tolerabilia esse debent, etiam si
All but short tolerable to be they owe, also if
All evils which are short should be tolerable, even if they be

magna sint. Hæc habui, de Amicitia quæ
great they may be. These I had, from Friendship which
great. These things I had to say concerning

dicerem. Vos autem hortor, ut ita virtutem
 I might say. You but I exhort, that so virtue
Friendship. But I exhort you, that you so consider virtue,

locetis, sine quâ amicitia esse non potest,
 you may place, without which friendship to be not is able,
without which friendship cannot exist, that, it only excepted,

ut, eâ exceptâ, nihil amicitia præstabilius putetis.
 that, it excepted, nothing friendship more excellent you may think.
you should regard nothing as more excellent than friendship.

FINIS.
 THE END.

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